Armed Servants Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations

Name: Armed Servants Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations
Price: 27.14 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780674017610

ISBN-10: 0674017617

ISBN-13: 9780674017610

Edition: 2003

Authors: Peter D. Feaver

List price: $36.00

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Description:

How do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of…

Book details

List price: $36.00
Copyright year: 2003
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Publication date: 3/15/2005
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 400
Size: 5.69" wide x 8.94" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 1.144
Language: English



Preface



Introduction



Huntington's Cold War Puzzle



The Informal Agency Theory



A Formal Agency Model of Civil-Military Relations



An Agency Theory Solution to the Cold War Puzzle



Explaining the Post-Cold War ""Crisis,"" 1990-2000



Using Agency Theory to Explore the Use of Force in the Post-ColdWar Era



Conclusion


Notes


References


Index