Games and Information : An Introduction to Game Theory

ISBN-10: 0631210954
ISBN-13: 9780631210955
Edition: 3rd 2001 (Revised)
Authors: Eric Rasmusen
List price: $77.95
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Description: Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory uses simple modelling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics.  More...

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Book details

List price: $77.95
Edition: 3rd
Copyright year: 2001
Publisher: Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, John
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 476
Size: 7.00" wide x 9.75" long x 1.25" tall
Weight: 2.090
Language: English

Written in a crisp and approachable style, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory uses simple modelling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics. The third edition brings the text totally up-to-date. New topics include price discrimination, mechanism design, and value uncertainty in auctions. Other chapters have been extensively reorganized or rewritten.Two of the most novel features of the new edition are not contained within its covers. One is the website at http://php.indiana.edu/~erasmuse/GI/index.html which includes answers to problems posed in the text, new questions and answers, and various supplementary materials. The other is a new book, Readings in Games and Information (also from Blackwell Publishers), which contains hard-to-locate scholarly articles, news clippings, and cartoons arranged to correspond with the chapters of the text.The book will be an indispensable tool for undergraduates studying advanced microeconomics and of considerable interest to graduates, lecturers and researchers of game theory and information economics.

List of Figuresp. x
List of Tablesp. xiii
List of Gamesp. xv
Prefacep. xviii
Contents and Purposep. xviii
Changes in the Second Edition, 1994p. xviii
Changes in the Third Edition, 2001p. xix
Changes in the Fourth Edition, 2006p. xx
Using the Bookp. xxii
The Level of Mathematicsp. xxii
Other Booksp. xxiii
Contact Informationp. xxviii
Acknowledgementsp. xxviii
Introductionp. 1
Historyp. 1
Game Theory's Methodp. 2
Exemplifying Theoryp. 2
This Book's Stylep. 4
Notesp. 6
Game Theoryp. 9
The Rules of the Gamep. 11
Definitionsp. 11
Dominated and Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemmap. 19
Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Seap. 22
Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, the Battle of the Sexes, and Ranked Coordinationp. 26
Focal Pointsp. 32
Notesp. 33
Problemsp. 36
Classroom Game: Fisheries (polished)p. 39
Informationp. 40
The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Gamep. 40
Information Setsp. 45
Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Informationp. 49
The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Gamesp. 52
An Example: The Png Settlement Gamep. 61
Notesp. 64
Problemsp. 66
Classroom Game: Bayes' Rule at the Bar (in between)p. 68
Mixed and Continuous Strategiesp. 69
Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Gamep. 69
The Payoff-equating Method and Games of Timingp. 74
Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The Civic Duty Gamep. 81
Randomizing Is Not Always Mixing: The Auditing Gamep. 85
Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Gamep. 87
Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, and Strategic Substitutesp. 90
Existence of Equilibriump. 95
Notesp. 98
Problemsp. 103
Classroom Game: The War of Attrition (polished)p. 107
Dynamic Games with Symmetric Informationp. 108
Subgame Perfectnessp. 108
An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence Ip. 111
Credible Threats, Sunks Costs, and the Open-set Problem in the Game of Nuisance Suitsp. 113
Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto Perfectionp. 120
Notesp. 122
Problemsp. 123
Classroom Game: U.S. Air for Sale (polished)p. 126
Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Informationp. 128
Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradoxp. 128
Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk Theoremp. 130
Reputation: The One-sided Prisoner's Dilemmap. 136
Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Gamep. 137
Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations: Customer Switching Costsp. 141
Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Gamep. 143
Notesp. 147
Problemsp. 151
Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (in between)p. 155
Dynamic Games with Incomplete Informationp. 156
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and IIIp. 156
Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Entry Deterrence and PhD Admissions Gamesp. 160
The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and Vp. 164
Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The Gang of Four Modelp. 166
The Axelrod Tournamentp. 169
Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Modelp. 170
Notesp. 172
Problemsp. 175
Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under Incomplete Information (improveable)p. 177
Asymmetric Informationp. 179
Moral Hazard: Hidden Actionsp. 181
Categories of Asymmetric Information Modelsp. 181
A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Gamep. 184
The Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraintsp. 194
Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Gamep. 195
Notesp. 201
Problemsp. 204
Classroom Game: Moral Hazard Contracts Game (improveable)p. 210
Further Topics in Moral Hazardp. 211
Efficiency Wagesp. 211
Tournamentsp. 214
Institutions and Agency Problemsp. 216
Renegotiation: The Repossession Gamep. 219
State-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and IIp. 222
Joint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Modelp. 227
The Multitask Agency Problemp. 230
Notesp. 236
Problemsp. 239
Classroom Game: Lobbying Teams (polished)p. 242
Adverse Selectionp. 243
Introduction: Production Game VIp. 243
Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and IIp. 249
Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons Il and IVp. 252
Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game IIIp. 255
Market Microstructurep. 259
A Variety of Applicationsp. 263
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Combined: Production Game VIIp. 266
Notesp. 269
Problemsp. 272
Classroom Game: Adverse Selection in Stock Sales (improveable)p. 275
Mechanism Design and Postcontractual Hidden Knowledgep. 276
Mechanisms, Unravelling, Cross Checking, and the Revelation Principlep. 276
Myerson Mechanism Designp. 287
An Example of Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge: The Salesman Gamep. 289
The Groves Mechanismp. 293
Price Discriminationp. 296
Rate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurementp. 304
Notesp. 314
Problemsp. 316
Classroom Game: Regulatory Ratcheting (improveable)p. 319
Signalingp. 320
The Informed Player Moves First: Signallingp. 320
Variants on the Signalling Model of Educationp. 324
General Comments on Signalling in Educationp. 329
The Informed Player Moves Second: Screeningp. 330
Two Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issuesp. 338
Signal Jamming and Limit Pricingp. 341
Countersignallingp. 345
Notesp. 348
Problemsp. 349
Classroom Game: Signalling Marriageability (improveable)p. 353
Applicationsp. 355
Bargainingp. 357
The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Piep. 357
The Nash Bargaining Solutionp. 359
Alternating Offers over Finite Timep. 361
Alternating Offers over Infinite Timep. 362
Incomplete Informationp. 365
Setting Up a Way to Bargain: the Myerson-Satterthwaite Modelp. 369
Notesp. 380
Problemsp. 381
Classroom Game: Labor Bargaining (polished)p. 384
Auctionsp. 385
Values Private and Common, Continuous and Discretep. 385
Optimal Strategies under Different Rules in Private-value Auctionsp. 390
Revenue Equivalence, Risk Aversion, and Uncertaintyp. 403
Reserve Prices and the Marginal Revenue Approachp. 409
Common-value Auctions and the Winner's Cursep. 414
Asymmetric Equilibria, Affiliation, and Linkage: The Wallet Gamep. 423
Notesp. 428
Problemsp. 430
Classroom Game: Auctions (polished)p. 432
Pricingp. 433
Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisitedp. 433
Capacity Constraints: The Edgeworth Paradoxp. 436
Location Modelsp. 441
Comparative Statics and Supermodular Gamesp. 449
Vertical Differentiationp. 454
Durable Monopolyp. 461
Notesp. 467
Problemsp. 469
Classroom Game: The Kleit Oligopoly Game (polished)p. 472
Mathematical Appendixp. 473
Notationp. 473
The Greek Alphabetp. 475
Glossaryp. 475
Formulas and Functionsp. 479
Probability Distributionsp. 480
Supermodularityp. 482
Fixed Point Theoremsp. 484
Genericityp. 485
Discountingp. 486
Riskp. 487
References and Name Indexp. 493
Subject Indexp. 521
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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