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Preface | |
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Introduction: The Place of Mind in a Scientific Universe | |
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Cartesian Dualism | |
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Human Minds and Animal Machines | |
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Second Meditation: The Nature of the Human Mind, and How It Is Better Known Than the Body | |
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Sixth Meditation: The Existence of Material Things, and the Real Distinction Between Mind and Body | |
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To More, 5 February 1649 | |
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The Ghost in the Machine | |
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Gilbert Ryle, Descartes' Myth | |
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Norman Malcolm, Knowledge of Other Minds | |
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The Human Brain | |
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Brian Cooney, Brain Events | |
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Materialism | |
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The Identity Thesis | |
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U. T. Place, Is Consciousness a Brain Process? | |
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J. J. C. Smart, Sensations and Brain Processes | |
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Saul Kripke, The Identity Relation: Selections from Naming and Necessity | |
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Eliminative Materialism | |
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Richard Rorty, Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories | |
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Paul M. Churchland, Eliminative Materialism | |
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Functionalism | |
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David M. Armstrong, The Nature of Mind | |
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Jerry A. Fodor, Materialism | |
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Supervenience | |
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John Haugeland, Ontological Supervenience | |
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Jaegwom Kim, The Mind-Body Problem: Taking Stock after Forty Years | |
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Minds and Computers | |
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Introduction | |
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A Harper's Magazine Forum, Our Machines, Ourselves | |
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Richard B. White, Some Basic Concepts of Computability Theory | |
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Hilary Putnam, The Nature of Mental States | |
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Jerry A. Fodor, Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology | |
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John R. Searle, Do Minds Compute? | |
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Minds, Brains, and Programs | |
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Is the Brain a Digital Computer? | |
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Intentionality | |
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Introduction | |
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Roderick M. Chisholm, Brentano on Descriptive Psychology and the Intentional | |
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Daniel C. Dennett, Intentional Systems | |
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Fred Dretske, If You Can't Make One, You Don't Know How It Works | |
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Consciousness and Qualia | |
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Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat? | |
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Keith Campbell, A Critique of Central-State Materialism | |
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Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia | |
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Patricia Smith Churchland and Paul M. Churchland, Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality | |
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Colin McGinn, Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? | |
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David Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness | |
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Brian Loar, Phenomenal States | |
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Selves | |
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John Locke, Of Identity and Diversity | |
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David Hume, Of Personal Identity | |
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Derek Parfit, Selections from Reasons and Persons | |
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Thomas Nagel, Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness | |
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Daniel C. Dennett, Why Everyone Is a Novelist | |
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Sydney Shoemaker, Self and Substance | |
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Glossary | |
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Works Cited | |