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Preface | |
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Economics | |
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Definitions | |
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Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly | |
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Further Topics | |
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Law and Policy | |
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Some Interpretation Issues | |
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Enacting the Antitrust Law | |
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What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? | |
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Enforcement | |
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Optimal Enforcement Theory | |
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Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws | |
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Appendix | |
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Cartels | |
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Cartels | |
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Conscious Parallelism | |
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Conclusion | |
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Development of Section 1 Doctrine | |
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The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law | |
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Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule | |
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Conclusion | |
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Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule | |
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The Case for Price Fixing | |
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Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments | |
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Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule | |
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Agreement | |
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The Development of Inference Doctrine | |
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Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory | |
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Facilitating Mechanisms | |
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Data Dissemination Cases | |
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Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices | |
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Basing Point Pricing: Economics | |
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Boycotts | |
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Pre-Socony | |
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Post-Socony | |
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Post-BMI/Sylvania | |
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Conclusion | |
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Monopolization | |
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Development of Section 2 Doctrine | |
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Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases | |
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Predatory Pricing | |
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Conclusion | |
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Power | |
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Measuring Market Power | |
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Determinants of Market Power | |
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Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane | |
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Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa | |
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Measuring Power: Guidelines | |
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Attempts | |
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The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine | |
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Dangerous Probability Requirement | |
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Vertical Restraints | |
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Resale Price Maintenance | |
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Vertical Nonprice Restraints | |
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Manufacturer Retains Title | |
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Agreement | |
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Tying and Exclusive Dealing | |
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Introduction | |
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Early Cases | |
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Development of Per-Se Rule | |
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Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule | |
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Technological Tying | |
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Exclusive Dealing | |
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Appendix | |
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Horizontal Mergers | |
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Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law | |
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Horizontal Merger Law | |
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Conclusion | |
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Appendix | |
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Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate | |
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Vertical Mergers | |
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Conglomerate Mergers | |
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Concluding Remarks | |
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Antitrust and the State | |
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Noerr-Pennington Doctrine | |
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Parker Doctrine | |
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Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines | |
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Index | |