Delegation and Agency in International Organizations

ISBN-10: 0521680468

ISBN-13: 9780521680462

Edition: 2006

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Description: Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

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Book details

List price: $45.99
Copyright year: 2006
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 9/14/2006
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 426
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 1.672
Language: English

David A. Lake is Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego.

Daniel L. Nielson is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University.

Michael J. Tierney is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at The College of William & Mary.

Introduction
Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory
Variation in Principal Preferences, Structure, Decision Rules, and Private Benefits
A problem of principals: common agency and social lending at the multilateral development banks Mona Lyne
US domestic politics and international monetary fund policy
Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems
Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality
Delegation and discretion in the European Union
Variation in Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, and Permeability
How agents matter
Screening power: international organizations as informative agents
Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO
Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity
Delegation to international courts and the limits of recontracting political power
Directions for Future Research
The logic of delegation to international organizations
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