Delegation and Agency in International Organizations

Name: Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Price: 42.7 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780521680462

ISBN-10: 0521680468

ISBN-13: 9780521680462

Edition: 2006

Authors: Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Randall Calvert

List price: $42.99

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Description:

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic…

Book details

List price: $42.99
Copyright year: 2006
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 9/14/2006
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 426
Size: 6.18" wide x 8.94" long x 0.98" tall
Weight: 1.474
Language: English

David A. Lake is Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego.

Daniel L. Nielson is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University.

Michael J. Tierney is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at The College of William & Mary.




Introduction



Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory




Variation in Principal Preferences, Structure, Decision Rules, and Private Benefits



A problem of principals: common agency and social lending at the multilateral development banks Mona Lyne




US domestic politics and international monetary fund policy




Why multilateralism? Foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems




Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations: the case of IMF conditionality




Delegation and discretion in the European Union




Variation in Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, and Permeability



How agents matter




Screening power: international organizations as informative agents




Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? Staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO




Delegating IMF conditionality: understanding variations in control and conformity




Delegation to international courts and the limits of recontracting political power




Directions for Future Research



The logic of delegation to international organizations