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| Preface | |
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| Questions and Answers | |
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| Paths of Political Development | |
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| Britain | |
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| Argentina | |
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| Singapore | |
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| South Africa | |
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| The Agenda | |
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| Our Argument | |
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| Democracy versus Nondemocracy | |
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| Building Blocks of Our Approach | |
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| Toward Our Basic Story | |
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| Our Theory of Democratization | |
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| Democratic Consolidation | |
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| Determinants of Democracy | |
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| Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict | |
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| Democracy in a Picture | |
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| Overview of the Book | |
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| What Do We Know about Democracy? | |
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| Measuring Democracy | |
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| Patterns of Democracy | |
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| Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution | |
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| Crises and Democracy | |
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| Social Unrest and Democratization | |
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| The Literature | |
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| Our Contribution | |
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| Modeling Politics | |
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| Democratic Politics | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Aggregating Individual Preferences | |
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| Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem | |
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| Our Workhorse Models | |
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| Democracy and Political Equality | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Nondemocratic Politics | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics | |
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| Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies | |
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| Commitment Problems | |
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| A Simple Game of Promises | |
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| A Dynamic Model | |
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| Incentive-Compatible Promises | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy | |
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| Democratization | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Role of Political Institutions | |
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| Preferences over Political Institutions | |
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| Political Power and Institutions | |
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| A Static Model of Democratization | |
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| Democratization or Repression? | |
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| A Dynamic Model of Democratization | |
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| Subgame Perfect Equilibria | |
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| Alternative Political Identities | |
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| Targeted Transfers | |
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| Power of the Elites in Democracy | |
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| Ideological Preferences over Regimes | |
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| Democratization in a Picture | |
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| Equilibrium Revolutions | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Coups and Consolidation | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Incentives for Coups | |
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| A Static Model of Coups | |
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| A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy | |
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| Alternative Political Identities | |
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| Targeted Transfers | |
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| Power in Democracy and Coups | |
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| Consolidation in a Picture | |
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| Defensive Coups | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Putting the Models to Work | |
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| The Role of the Middle Class | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Three-Class Model | |
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| Emergence of Partial Democracy | |
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| From Partial to Full Democracy | |
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| Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer | |
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| Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners | |
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| The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Economic Structure and Democracy | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Economic Structure and Income Distribution | |
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| Political Conflict | |
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| Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy | |
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| Costs of Coup on Capital and Land | |
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| Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy | |
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| Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists | |
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| Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice | |
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| Economic Institutions | |
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| Human Capital | |
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| Conjectures about Political Development | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Globalization and Democracy | |
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| Introduction | |
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| A Model of an Open Economy | |
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| Political Conflict - Democratic Consolidation | |
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| Political Conflict - Transition to Democracy | |
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| Financial Integration | |
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| Increased Political Integration | |
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| Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Conclusions and the Future of Democracy | |
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| Conclusions and the Future of Democracy | |
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| Paths of Political Development Revisited | |
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| Extensions and Areas for Future Research | |
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| The Future of Democracy | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Probabilistic Voting Models | |
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| Lobbying | |
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| Partisan Politics and Political Capture | |
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| Bibliography | |
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| Index | |