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| Preface: reintroducing the economic nature of the firm | |
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| Within and Among Firms: The Division of Labor | |
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| From The Wealth of Nations | |
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| From Capital Karl Marx | |
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| From Risk, Uncertainty and Profit | |
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| From The Modern Corporation and Private Property | |
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| The use of knowledge in society | |
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| Corporate governance | |
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| The Nature of the Firm | |
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| The nature of the firm Ronald Coase | |
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| Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process | |
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| The governance of contractual relations | |
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| The limits of firms: incentive and bureaucratic features | |
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| Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity | |
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| The boundaries of the firm revisited | |
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| The Employment Relation, the Human Factor and Internal Organization | |
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| Production, information costs, and economic organization | |
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| Contested exchange new microfoundations for the political economy of capitalism | |
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| Understanding the employment relation: the analysis of idiosyncratic exchange | |
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| Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design | |
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| Work motivation | |
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| From Worker Participation | |
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| Finance and the Control of the Firm | |
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| Mergers and the market for corporate control | |
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| Agency problems and the theory of the firm | |
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| Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure | |
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| Organizational forms and investment decisions | |
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| The rise in managerial stock ownership | |
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| Executive compensation as an agency problem | |
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| An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm | |
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| Ownership and the nature of the firm | |
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