Designing Federalism A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions

ISBN-10: 0521016487

ISBN-13: 9780521016483

Edition: 2003

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Description: The design of federal states from Russia and the Ukraine to Canada and the European Union typically develops from a false set of assumptions regarding the institutional building blocks of such a state. Rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, the authors argue that a number of institutional variables, not normally associated with federal design, can be critical in determining federal success. (The variables are the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment.)

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Book details

List price: $45.99
Copyright year: 2003
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 2/9/2004
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 398
Size: 6.00" wide x 8.75" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 1.188
Language: English

Peter C. Ordeshook is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has published over 120 papers in professional journals, including the American Political Science Review, Post-Soviet Affairs, Constitutional Political Economy and Post-Soviet Geography and Economics. His authored and coauthored books include An Introduction to Positive Political Theory; Game Theory and Political Theory; The Balance of Power; Designing Federalism; A Political Theory Primer; Endogenous Time Preferences in Social Networks; and Lessons for Citizens of a New Democracy (in English, Italian and Ukrainian).

Federations and the theoretical problem
Why Federalism
Definitions
The long search for stability
Federalism as nuisance
Federalism as engine of prosperity
Riker as intermediary
The fundamental problem of stability
Basic premises and conclusions
Federal bargaining
Alliances versus federations
The private character of public goods
Equilibrium selection and redistribution
The 'federal problem'
Bargaining for control of the center
Allocating jurisdictions
Three levels of institutional design
Two cases of uninstitutionalized bargaining
The Czechoslovak dissolution
The Soviet dissolution
The feasibility of success in initial bargaining
Secession: the special road to renegotiation
Representation
Two alternative models of Federalism
A national venue for bargaining
Within versus without
Direct versus delegated representation
Other parameters of design
Bilateral decision making and the case of Russia
Incentives
Institutional enforcement
The court
Some simple rules of constitutional design
Voters versus elites
Desirable imperfection and a democratic as if principle
Political parties in a federal state
An extreme hypothesis
Parties in a democracy
The idealized party system
Integrated parties
Integration outside the United States
Australian Federalism and the role of parties
Canada
India
Leadership incentives
Rank and file incentives
The party and Federalism
1967 and thereafter
Institutional sources of federal stability I
Introduction
Level 2 and the federalist
Level 3 institutions
Australia, Canada, Germany, and India revisited
Germany
Canada
Canada vs, Australia and India
Local and regional design parameters
Institutional sources of federal stability II
Electoral mechanisms and societal structures
Representation
Ethnicity
Defining federal subjects
Number of local jurisdictions
Authority over local governments
Bicameralism
Symmetry
Presidential authority
Presidential selection
Electoral connections
Level 1 and the scope of the federal mandate
Level 0 - things beyond design
Designing Federalism
Russia
Electoral arrangements
Regional autonomy
Constitutional matters
Parties and the current status quo
The European Union
Background
The role of parties
The puzzle of the collusion
France versus Britain
EU institutional design
Conclusion
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