Political Logic of Economic Reform in China

Name: Political Logic of Economic Reform in China
Price: 8.34 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780520077072

ISBN-10: 0520077075

ISBN-13: 9780520077072

Edition: 1993

Authors: Susan L. Shirk

List price: $38.95

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In the past decade, China was able to carry out economic reform without political reform, while the Soviet Union attempted the opposite strategy. How did China succeed at economic market reform without changing communist rule? Susan Shirk shows that Chinese communist political institutions are more flexible and less centralized than their Soviet counterparts were. Shirk pioneers a rational choice institutional approach to analyze policy-making in a non-democratic authoritarian country and to explain the history of Chinese market reforms from 1979 to the present. Drawing on extensive interviews with high-level Chinese officials, she pieces together detailed histories of economic reform…

Book details

List price: $38.95
Copyright year: 1993
Publisher: University of California Press
Publication date: 7/15/1993
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 412
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 1.298
Language: English



Acknowledgments


Formal Authority Relations Among Central Communist Party and Government Institutions in the People's Republic of China



Introduction



The Political Logic of Economic Reform



The Prereform Chinese Economy and the Decision to Initiate Market Reforms



Chinese Political Institutions



Authority Relations: The Communist Party and the Government



Leadership Incentives: Political Succession and Reciprocal Accountability



Bargaining Arena: The Government Bureaucracy



Who Is Enfranchised in the Policy-making Process?



Decision Rules: Delegation by Consensus



Chinese Political Institutions and the Path of Economic Reforms



Economic Reform Policy-Making



Playing to the Provinces: Fiscal Decentralization and the Politics of Reform



Creating Vested Interests in Reform: Industrial Reform Takeoff, 1978-81



Leadership Succession and Policy Conflict: The Choice Between Profit Contracting and Substituting Tax-for-Profit, 1982-83



Building Bureaucratic Consensus: Formulating the Tax-for-Profit Policy, 1983-84



The Power of Particularism: Abortive Price Reform and the Revival of Profit Contracting, 1985-88



Conclusion



The Political Lessons of Economic Reform in China


Bibliography


Index