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| What Is Mind Design? | |
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| Perspectives and things | |
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| The Turing test | |
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| Intentionality | |
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| Original intentionality | |
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| Computers | |
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| Formal systems | |
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| Automatic formal systems | |
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| Computers and intelligence | |
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| GOFAI | |
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| Interpreted formal systems | |
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| Intelligence by explicit reasoning | |
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| New-fangled Al | |
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| Connectionist networks | |
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| Embodied and embedded Al | |
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| What's missing from mind design? | |
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| Notes | |
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| Computing Machinery and Intelligence | |
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| The imitation game | |
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| Critique of the new problem | |
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| The machines concerned in the game | |
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| Digital computers | |
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| Universality of digital computers | |
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| Contrary views on the main question | |
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| Learning machines | |
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| Notes | |
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| True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works | |
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| The intentional strategy and how it works | |
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| True believers as intentional systems | |
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| Why does the intentional strategy work? | |
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| Notes | |
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| Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search | |
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| Symbols and physical symbol systems | |
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| Laws of qualitative structure | |
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| Physical symbol systems | |
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| Development of the symbol-system hypothesis | |
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| The evidence | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Heuristic search | |
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| Problem Solving | |
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| Search in problem solving | |
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| Intelligence without much search | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| A Framework for Representing Knowledge | |
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| Frames | |
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| Artificial intelligence and human problem solving | |
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| Default assignment | |
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| Language, understanding, and scenarios | |
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| Words, sentences, and meanings | |
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| Scenarios | |
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| Scenarios and "questions" | |
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| Questions, systems, and cases | |
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| Learning, memory, and paradigms | |
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| Requests to memory | |
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| Excuses | |
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| Clusters, classes, and a geographic analogy | |
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| Analogies and alternative descriptions | |
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| Frames and paradigms | |
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| Appendix: criticism of the logistic approach | |
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| From Micro-Worlds to Knowledge Representation: AI at an Impasse | |
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| The early seventies: micro-worlds | |
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| SHRDLU: understanding natural language | |
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| "Scene parsing" and computer vision | |
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| Learning new concepts or categories | |
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| The later seventies: knowledge representation | |
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| Frames and knowledge representation | |
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| Scripts and primitive actions | |
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| KRL: a knowledge-representation language | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Notes | |
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| Minds, Brains, and Programs | |
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| Notes | |
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| The Architecture of Mind: A Connectionist Approach | |
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| Why brain-style computation? | |
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| The connectionist framework | |
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| Computational features of connectionist models | |
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| The state of the art | |
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| Some architecture | |
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| The scaling problem | |
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| The generalization problem | |
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| Connectionist Modeling: Neural Computation / Mental Connections | |
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| Levels of analysis: neural and mental structures | |
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| The symbolic paradigm | |
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| The subsymbolic paradigm | |
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| Semantic interpretation | |
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| The subsymbolic level | |
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| Subsymbolic computation | |
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| Subsymbolic inference and the statistical connection | |
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| Higher-level descriptions | |
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| The best-fit principle | |
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| Productions, sequential processing, and logical inference | |
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| The dynamics of activation patterns | |
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| Schemata | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective | |
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| The classical view of theories | |
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| Problems and alternative approaches | |
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| Elementary brainlike networks | |
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| Representation and learning in brainlike networks | |
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| Some functional properties of brainlike networks | |
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| How faithfully do these networks depict the brain? | |
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| Computational neuroscience: the naturalization of epistemology | |
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| Concluding remarks | |
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| Connectionism and Cognition | |
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| Notes | |
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| Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Levels of explanation | |
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| The nature of the dispute | |
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| Complex mental representations | |
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| Representations as "distributed" over microfeatures | |
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| Structure-sensitive operations | |
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| Learning | |
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| Reasoning | |
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| The need for symbol systems: productivity, systematicity, and inferential coherence | |
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| Productivity of thought | |
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| Systematicity of cognitive representation | |
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| The systematicity of inference | |
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| Summary | |
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| The allure of connectionism | |
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| Replies: why the usual reasons given for preferring a connectionist architecture are invalid | |
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| Parallel computation and the issue of speed | |
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| Resistance to noise and physical damage (and the argument for distributed representation) | |
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| "Soft" constraints, continuous magnitudes, and stochastic mechanisms | |
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| Explicitness of rules | |
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| On "brain-style" modeling | |
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| Concluding comments: connectionism as a theory of implementation | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Notes | |
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| Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Eliminativism and folk psychology | |
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| Propositional attitudes and common-sense psychology | |
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| A family of connectionist hypotheses | |
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| A connectionist model of memory | |
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| Objections and replies | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Notes | |
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| The Presence of a Symbol | |
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| A slippery LOT | |
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| The pocket Fodor | |
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| On being more explicit | |
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| Connectionism and explicit representation | |
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| Code-fixation: its symptoms and cure | |
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| All the world's a processor | |
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| Conclusions: from code to process | |
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| Notes | |
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| Intelligence without Representation | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The evolution of intelligence | |
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| A story | |
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| Abstraction as a dangerous weapon A continuing story | |
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| Incremental intelligence | |
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| Decomposition by function | |
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| Decomposition by activity | |
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| Who has the representations? | |
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| No representation versus no central representation | |
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| The methodology in practice | |
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| Methodological maxims | |
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| An instantiation of the methodology: Allen | |
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| A second example: Herbert | |
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| What this is not | |
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| It isn't connectionism | |
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| It isn't neural networks | |
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| It isn't production rules | |
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| It isn't a blackboard | |
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| It isn't German philosophy | |
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| Key ideas | |
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| Situatedness | |
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| Embodiment | |
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| Intelligence | |
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| Emergence | |
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| Limits to growth | |
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| Dynamics and Cognition | |
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| The governing problem | |
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| Two kinds of governor | |
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| Conceptual frameworks | |
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| Morals | |
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| Three kinds of system | |
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| Three conceptions of cognition | |
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| An example of dynamical research | |
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| Is the dynamical conception viable? | |
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| Notes | |
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| Acknowledgments | |
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| Bibliography | |