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| Acknowledgments | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Identity, Commitment and Agency | |
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| Aspects of Identity and Agency | |
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| Identity and the Centrality of Traits | |
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| Aspects of Personal Identity | |
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| Relative Centrality of Aspects | |
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| Identity and Practical Deliberation | |
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| The Pragmatic Implications of Identity Attribution | |
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| Notes | |
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| Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation | |
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| The Moral Life of a Pragmatist | |
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| Character, Temperament, and Emotion | |
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| Natural Affection and Responsibility for Character: A Critique of Kantian Views of the V... | |
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| On the Old Saw That Character Is Destiny | |
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| Restoring the Connection between Character and Behavior | |
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| Character and Language: The Figurative Turn | |
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| Constitutive Misfortune and Acting in Character | |
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| Understanding Action from the "Inside" | |
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| Notes | |
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| Hume and Moral Emotions | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Received View about Hume on Emotions | |
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| Natural | |
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| Natural and Normative | |
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| Emotions as Complexes | |
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| Moral Emotion and Subjectivity | |
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| Notes | |
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| The Place of Emotions in Kantian Morality | |
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| Emotions Matter in Moral Assessment | |
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| The Kantian Accommodation | |
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| Evaluating These Claims | |
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| Notes | |
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| Moral Psychology and the Social Virtues | |
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| Vocation, Friendship, and Community: Limitations of the Personal-Impersonal Framework | |
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| Gender and Moral Luck | |
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| Women and Care | |
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| Women's Luck and Modern Ethical Theory | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Postscript | |
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| Notes | |
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| Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations | |
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| Why Must and How Might Friendship Be Governed by Duty? | |
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| Moral Chauvinism | |
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| The Implications of Some Bad Acts of Friendship | |
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| The Importance of Duty | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Notes | |
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| Trust, Affirmation, and Moral Character: A Critique of Kantian Morality | |
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| Prediction and Trust | |
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| Prediction and Kantian Moral Theory | |
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| One Thought Too Many | |
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| The Value of Trust | |
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| Notes | |
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| Why Honesty Is a Hard Virtue | |
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| Note | |
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| Rationality, Responsibility, and Morality Higher-Order Discrimination | |
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| Reciprocal First-Order Discrimination | |
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| Higher-Order Political Discrimination | |
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| Nonstereotypical Higher-Order Discrimination | |
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| Reciprocal Higher-Order Discrimination | |
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| Higher-Order Discrimination: A Species of Pseudorationality | |
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| Some Familiar Examples of Higher-Order Discrimination | |
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| Abettors of Higher-Order Discrimination | |
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| Higher-Order Discrimination: A Case of n-Level Pseudorationality | |
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| Notes | |
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| Obligation and Performance: A Kantian Account of Moral Conflict | |
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| Rational Egoism, Self, and Others | |
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| A Skeptical Challenge | |
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| A Subjective Egoist Justification of Morality | |
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| A Strategic Defense | |
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| Problems with the Strategic Justification of Morality | |
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| An Objective-Egoist Justification of Morality: A Neo-Aristotelian Approach | |
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| The Problem of Fission | |
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| An Egoist Account of Fission: The Base Case for Extending Egoist Concern to Others | |
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| Intimates: Extending Egoist Concern Further | |
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| Why Cultivate Other-Selves? | |
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| Justifying Morality: Extending Egoist Concern Further Still | |
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| Degrees of Egoist Concern | |
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| The Scope of Egoist Concern: Still Too Narrow? | |
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| Is the Egoist's Concern for Other-Selves Too Mercenary? | |
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| Prospects for an Egoist Justification of Morality | |
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| Notes | |
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| Is Akratic Action Always Irrational? | |
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| Why Is Continence Rational and Incontinence Irrational? | |
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| The Irrationality of the Sources of Akratic Action: Emotion and Desire | |
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| Does the Akratic Choose the Less Rational Course of Action? | |
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| Renegade Reasons versus New Considerations | |
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| Rationality in Action as Evaluative Consistency | |
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| Revise or Be Continent | |
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| Obstinacy and Continence | |
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| Notes | |
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| Rationality, Responsibility, and Pathological Indifference | |
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| Pathological Indifference | |
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| Ideal Reflective Equilibria | |
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| The Dilemma Regarding Responsibility | |
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| The Dilemma with Regard to Rationality | |
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| Internal Justification and Rationality | |
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| Notes | |
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| Virtue Theory | |
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| Some Advantages of Virtue Ethics | |
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| Moral Asymmetry | |
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| The Symmetry in Virtue | |
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| How Ordinary Morality and Kantian Morality Devalue Moral Agents | |
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| The Incoherence of Commonsense Moral Thinking | |
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| Notes | |
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| On the Primacy of Character | |
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| Bibliography | |
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| Contributors | |