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| Preface | |
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| The Nature of Mind | |
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| Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes | |
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| Why Folk Psychology Is a Theory | |
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| Why Folk Psychology Might (Really) Be False | |
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| Arguments against Elimination | |
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| The Conservative Nature of Functionalism | |
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| Beyond Folk Psychology | |
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| Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality | |
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| Four Problems concerning Qualia | |
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| The problem of inverted/gerrymandered qualia | |
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| The problem of absent qualia | |
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| The problem of distinguishing states with qualia from states without | |
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| The differentiation problem | |
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| The Problem of Nonstandard Realizations | |
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| Qualia in the Chinese nation | |
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| Intentionality in the Chinese room | |
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| Functionalism and Methodology | |
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| Conceptual conservatism | |
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| Top down versus bottom up | |
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| Reductionism | |
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| Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States | |
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| Intertheoretic Reduction | |
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| Theoretical Change and Perceptual Change | |
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| Thomas Nagel's Arguments | |
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| The first argument | |
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| The second argument | |
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| The third argument | |
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| Jackson's Knowledge Argument | |
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| The first shortcoming | |
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| The second shortcoming | |
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| Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson | |
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| The Persistent Equivocation | |
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| Other Invalid Instances | |
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| A Genuinely Nonequivocal Knowledge Argument | |
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| Converting a Third-Person Account into a First-Person Account | |
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| Some Reductive Strategies in Cognitive Neurobiology | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Laminar Cortex, Vertical Connections, and Topographic Maps | |
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| Sensorimotor Coordination | |
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| Coordinate Transformation: Its Physical Implementation | |
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| Cortex with More than Two Layers | |
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| Beyond State-Space Sandwiches | |
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| The Representational Power of State Spaces | |
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| Concluding Remarks | |
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| Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior | |
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| Objections to the Theoretical View | |
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| An Alternative Form of Knowledge Representation | |
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| Addendum: Commentary on Dennett | |
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| Reductionism, Connectionism, and the Plasticity of Human Consciousness | |
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| The Plasticity Argument | |
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| The Cultural-Embedding Objection | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| The Structure of Science | |
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| The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of the Superempirical Virtues | |
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| How van Fraassen's Problem Collapses into Hume's Problem | |
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| The Primacy of the Superempirical Virtues | |
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| Toward a More Realistic Realism | |
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| On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective | |
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| The Classical View of Theories | |
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| Problems and Alternative Approaches | |
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| Elementary Brainlike Networks | |
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| Representation and Learning in Brainlike Networks | |
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| Some Functional Properties of Brainlike Networks | |
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| How Faithfully Do These Networks Depict the Brain? | |
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| Computational Neuroscience: The Naturalization of Epistemology | |
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| Concluding Remarks | |
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| On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Conceptual Organization in PDP Networks | |
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| Recognition and Understanding | |
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| Prototype Activation: A Unified Theory of Explanation | |
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| Property-cluster prototypes | |
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| Etiological prototypes | |
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| Practical prototypes | |
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| Superordinate prototypes | |
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| Social-interaction prototypes | |
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| Motivational prototypes | |
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| Inference to the Best Explanation | |
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| Comparison with Earlier Models | |
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| Learning and Conceptual Change | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Multiple Conceptual Competence | |
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| Conceptual Change versus Conceptual Redeployment | |
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| What Drives Conceptual Change? | |
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| Automated Science | |
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| Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor | |
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| The Etiology of Perceptual Belief | |
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| Does encapsulated processing buy us theory-neutral perceptions? | |
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| Is the impenetrability thesis correct? | |
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| Is the encapsulation thesis relevant? | |
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| The Semantics of Observation Predicates | |
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| Objections to the network approach: Fodor's reductio | |
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| Belief networks versus causal connections | |
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| Sensational plasticity versus conceptual plasticity | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Conceptual Progress and Word-World Relations: In Search of the Essence of Natural Kinds | |
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| Natural Kinds and Scientific Progress: The Putnam-Kripke View | |
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| Natural Kinds as Law-Bound Kinds: Some Virtues, Consequences, and Difficulties | |
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| Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge | |
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| The Epistemology and Ontology of Morals | |
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| Moral Prototypes and Moral Development | |
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| Praxis, Theoria, and Progress | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |