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| Acknowledgments | |
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| What Are Institutions? How Should We Approach Them? | |
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| Three Views of Institutions in a Game-Theoretic Perspective | |
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| Aspects of Institutions: Shared Beliefs, Summary Representations of Equilibrium, and Endogenous Rules of the Game | |
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| Organization of the Book | |
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| Customary Property Rights and Community Norms | |
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| Customary Property Rights as a Self-organizing System | |
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| Community Norms as a Self-enforcing Solution to the Commons Problem | |
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| History versus Ecology as a Determinant of a Norm: The Case of Yi Korea | |
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| The Private-Ordered Governance of Trade, Contracts, and Markets | |
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| Traders' Norms | |
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| Cultural Beliefs and Self-enforcing Employment Contracts | |
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| Private Third-Party Governance: The Law Merchant | |
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| Moral Codes | |
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| Overall Market Governance Arrangements | |
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| Money as an Evolutive Convention | |
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| Organizational Architecture and Governance | |
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| Organizational Building Blocks: Hierarchical Decomposition, Information Assimilation, and Encapsulation | |
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| Types of Organizational Architecture | |
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| Governance of Organizational Architecture: A Preliminary Discussion | |
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| The Co-evolution of Organizational Conventions and Human Asset Types | |
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| Types of Mental Programs: Individuated versus Context-Oriented Human Assets | |
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| The Evolutionary Dynamics of Organizational Conventions | |
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| The Interactions of Organizational Fields and Gains from Diversity | |
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| The Relevance and Limits of the Evolutionary Game Model | |
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| States as Stable Equilibria in the Polity Domain | |
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| Three Prototypes of the State | |
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| Various Forms of the Democratic and Collusive States | |
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| A Game-Theoretic Concept of Institutions | |
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| Exogenous Rules of the Game and Endogenous Action-Choice Rules | |
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| The Institution as a Summary Representation of an Equilibrium Path | |
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| Feedback Loops of Institutionalization | |
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| The Synchronic Structure of Institutional Linkage | |
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| Social Embeddedness | |
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| Linked Games and Institutional Linkages | |
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| Institutional Complementarity | |
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| Subjective Game Models and the Mechanism of Institutional Change | |
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| Why Are Overall Institutional Arrangements Enduring? | |
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| Subjective Game Models and General Cognitive Equilibrium | |
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| The Mechanism of Institutional Change: The Cognitive Aspect | |
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| Diachronic Linkages of Institutions | |
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| Overlapping Social Embeddedness | |
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| The Reconfiguration of Bundling | |
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| Diachronic Institutional Complementarity | |
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| Comparative Corporate Governance | |
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| Governance of the Functional Hierarchy | |
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| Codetermination in the Participatory Hierarchy | |
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| Relational-Contingent Governance of the Horizontal Hierarchy | |
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| Types of Relational Financing and the Value of Tacit Knowledge | |
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| A Generic Definition of Relational Financing and Its Knowledge-Based Taxonomy | |
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| The Institutional Viability of Relational Financing | |
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| Institutional Complementarities, Co-emergence, and Crisis: The Case of the Japanese Main Bank System | |
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| The Main Bank Institution as a System of Shared Beliefs | |
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| Institutional Emergence: Unintended Fits | |
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| Endogenous Inertia, Misfits with Changing Environments, and a Crisis of Shared Beliefs | |
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| Institutional Innovation of the Silicon Valley Model in the Product System Development | |
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| Information-Systemic Architecture of the Silicon Valley Model | |
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| The VC Governance of Innovation by Tournament | |
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| Norms and Values in the Silicon Valley Model | |
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| The Stylized Factual Background for Modeling | |
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| Epilogue: Why Does Institutional Diversity Continue to Evolve? | |
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| Some Stylized Models of Overall Institutional Arrangements | |
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| Self-organizing Diversity in the Global Institutional Arrangement | |
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| Notes | |
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| References | |
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| Index | |