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Preface | |
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The Nature of Mind | |
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Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes | |
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Why Folk Psychology Is a Theory | |
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Why Folk Psychology Might (Really) Be False | |
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Arguments against Elimination | |
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The Conservative Nature of Functionalism | |
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Beyond Folk Psychology | |
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Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality | |
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Four Problems concerning Qualia | |
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The problem of inverted/gerrymandered qualia | |
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The problem of absent qualia | |
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The problem of distinguishing states with qualia from states without | |
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The differentiation problem | |
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The Problem of Nonstandard Realizations | |
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Qualia in the Chinese nation | |
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Intentionality in the Chinese room | |
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Functionalism and Methodology | |
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Conceptual conservatism | |
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Top down versus bottom up | |
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Reductionism | |
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Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States | |
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Intertheoretic Reduction | |
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Theoretical Change and Perceptual Change | |
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Thomas Nagel's Arguments | |
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The first argument | |
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The second argument | |
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The third argument | |
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Jackson's Knowledge Argument | |
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The first shortcoming | |
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The second shortcoming | |
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Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson | |
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The Persistent Equivocation | |
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Other Invalid Instances | |
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A Genuinely Nonequivocal Knowledge Argument | |
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Converting a Third-Person Account into a First-Person Account | |
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Some Reductive Strategies in Cognitive Neurobiology | |
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Introduction | |
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Laminar Cortex, Vertical Connections, and Topographic Maps | |
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Sensorimotor Coordination | |
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Coordinate Transformation: Its Physical Implementation | |
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Cortex with More than Two Layers | |
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Beyond State-Space Sandwiches | |
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The Representational Power of State Spaces | |
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Concluding Remarks | |
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Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior | |
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Objections to the Theoretical View | |
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An Alternative Form of Knowledge Representation | |
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Addendum: Commentary on Dennett | |
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Reductionism, Connectionism, and the Plasticity of Human Consciousness | |
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The Plasticity Argument | |
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The Cultural-Embedding Objection | |
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Conclusion | |
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The Structure of Science | |
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The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of the Superempirical Virtues | |
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How van Fraassen's Problem Collapses into Hume's Problem | |
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The Primacy of the Superempirical Virtues | |
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Toward a More Realistic Realism | |
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On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective | |
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The Classical View of Theories | |
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Problems and Alternative Approaches | |
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Elementary Brainlike Networks | |
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Representation and Learning in Brainlike Networks | |
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Some Functional Properties of Brainlike Networks | |
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How Faithfully Do These Networks Depict the Brain? | |
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Computational Neuroscience: The Naturalization of Epistemology | |
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Concluding Remarks | |
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On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach | |
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Introduction | |
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Conceptual Organization in PDP Networks | |
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Recognition and Understanding | |
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Prototype Activation: A Unified Theory of Explanation | |
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Property-cluster prototypes | |
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Etiological prototypes | |
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Practical prototypes | |
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Superordinate prototypes | |
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Social-interaction prototypes | |
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Motivational prototypes | |
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Inference to the Best Explanation | |
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Comparison with Earlier Models | |
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Learning and Conceptual Change | |
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Introduction | |
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Multiple Conceptual Competence | |
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Conceptual Change versus Conceptual Redeployment | |
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What Drives Conceptual Change? | |
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Automated Science | |
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Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor | |
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The Etiology of Perceptual Belief | |
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Does encapsulated processing buy us theory-neutral perceptions? | |
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Is the impenetrability thesis correct? | |
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Is the encapsulation thesis relevant? | |
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The Semantics of Observation Predicates | |
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Objections to the network approach: Fodor's reductio | |
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Belief networks versus causal connections | |
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Sensational plasticity versus conceptual plasticity | |
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Conclusion | |
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Conceptual Progress and Word-World Relations: In Search of the Essence of Natural Kinds | |
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Natural Kinds and Scientific Progress: The Putnam-Kripke View | |
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Natural Kinds as Law-Bound Kinds: Some Virtues, Consequences, and Difficulties | |
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Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge | |
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The Epistemology and Ontology of Morals | |
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Moral Prototypes and Moral Development | |
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Praxis, Theoria, and Progress | |
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References | |
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Index | |