Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism

Name: Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism
Price: 169.17 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9783211094419

ISBN-10: 3211094415

ISBN-13: 9783211094419

Edition: 2009

Authors: Nasrullah Memon, Jonathan David Farley, David L. Hicks, Torben Rosenorn

List price: $129.99

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Description:

The present work presents the most current research from mathematicians and computer scientists from around the world to develop strategies for counterterrorism and homeland security to the broader public. New mathematical and computational techniques concepts are have applied to counterterrorism and computer security problems. Topics covered include; strategies for disrupting terrorist cells, border penetration and security, terrorist cell formation and growth, data analysis of terrorist activity, terrorism deterrence strategies, information security , emergency response and planning. Since 2001, tremendous amounts of information have been gathered regarding terrorist cells and individuals…

Book details

List price: $129.99
Copyright year: 2009
Publisher: Springer Wien
Publication date: 8/29/2009
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 389
Size: 6.10" wide x 9.25" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 1.694
Language: English



Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism: Tools and Techniques for a New Challenge




Introduction



Organization



Conclusion and Acknowledgements



Network Analysis


Modeling Criminal Activity in Urban Landscapes




Introduction



Background and Motivation



Computational Criminology



Challenges and Needs



Modeling Paradigm



Mastermind Framework



Mathematical Framework



Rapid Prototyping with CoreASM



Interactive Design with Control State ASMs



Mastermind: Modeling Criminal Activity



Overview



Agent Architecture



Urban Landscape Model



Space Evolution Module: ASM Model



Lessons Learned



Concluding Remarks



<l>5</l>


Extracting Knowledge from Graph Data in Adversarial Settings




Characteristics of Adversarial Settings



Sources of Graph Data



Eigenvectors and the Global Structure of a Graph



Visualization



Computation of Node Properties



Social Network Analysis (SNA)



Principal eigenvector of the adjacency matrix



Embedding Graphs in Geometric Space



The Walk Laplacian of a graph



Dimensionality reduction



The rightmost eigenvectors



The leftmost eigenvectors



The 'middle' eigenvectors



Working in a lower-dimensional space



Overlays of eigenvectors and edges



Using con-elation rather than connection



Summary


References


Mathematically Modeling Terrorist Cells: Examining the Strength of Structures of Small Sizes




"Back to Basics": Recap of the Poset Model of Terrorist Cells



Examining the Strength of Terrorist Cell Structures-Questions Involved and Relevance to Counterterrorist Operations



Definition of "Strength" in Terms of the Poset Model



Posets Addressed



Algorithms Used



Structures of Posets of Size 7: Observations and Patterns



Implications and Applicability



Ideas for Future Research



Conclusion


References


Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Temporal Reasoning for Criminal Forensics




Introduction



Temporal Knowledge Representation and Reasoning



Point-Interval Logic



Language and Point Graph Representation



Operations on Point Graphs



Inference



Deciding Consistency



Temper



Using Temper for Criminal Forensics-The London Bombing



Conclusion


References


Two Theoretical Research Questions Concerning the Structure of the Perfect Terrorist Cell



References



Forecasting


Understanding Terrorist Organizations with a Dynamic Model




Introduction



A Mathematical Model



Analysis of the Model



Discussion



Nascent terrorist organizations



Conditions for Victory



Stable Equilibria



Counter-Terrorism Strategies117



Targeting the leaders



Encouraging desertion



Minimization of Strength



Conclusions



Appendix



Proof of the theorem



Concrete Example of Strength Minimization


References


Inference Approaches to Constructing Covert Social Network Topologies




Introduction



Network Analysis



A Bayesian Inference Approach



Case 1 Analysis



Case 2 Analysis



Conclusions


References


A Mathematical Analysis of Short-term Responses to Threats of Terrorism




Introduction



Information Model



Defensive Measures



Analysis



Interaction between warnings and physical deployments



Effect of intelligence on defensive measures



Illustrative numerical experiments



Summary


References


Network Detection Theory




Introduction



Random Intersection Graphs165



Induced edge clique covers; exact quantities



Expected subgraph counts in the constant-?limit



Subgraph Count Variance



Dynamic Random Graphs



The telegraph process



The dynamic Erdï¿½s-Rï¿½nyi process



Tracking on Networks



The LRDT Framework for Static Networks



Hierarchical Hypothesis Management



The Hypothesis Lattice



The HHM Algorithm



An Example



Conclusion


References



Communication/Interpretation


Security of Underground Resistance Movements




Introduction



Best defense against optimal subversive strategies



Best defense against random subversive strategies



Maximizing the size of surviving components



Ensuring that the survivor graph remains connected


References


Intelligence Constraints on Terrorist Network Plots




Introduction



Tipping Point in Conspiracy Size



Tipping Point Examples



Stopping Rule for Terrorist Attack Multiplicity



Preventing Spectacular Attacks


References


On Heterogeneous Covert Networks




Introduction



Preliminaries



Secrecy and Communication in Homogeneous Covert Networks



Jemaah Islamiya Bali bombing



A First Approach to Heterogeneity in Covert Networks



The Optimal High Risk Interaction Pair



Approximating Optimal Heterogeneous Covert Networks


References


Two Models for Semi-Supervised Terrorist Group Detection




Introduction



Terrorist Group Detection from Crime and Demographics Data



COPLINK CrimeNet Explorer



TMODS



Offender Group Representation Model (OGRM)



Group Detection Model (GDM)



Offender Group Detection Model (OGDM)



Computing Similarity Score



Using Terrorist Modus Operandi Ontology



Deciding Threshold



Feature Selection



Experiments and Evaluation



Performance Matrix



Testbed: Terrorist Groups Detected in Bursa



Conclusion


References



Behavior


CAPE: Automatically Predicting Changes in Group Behavior




Introduction



CAPE Architecture



SitCAST Predictions



CONVEX and SitCAST



The CAPE Algorithm



The Change Table



Learning Predictive Conditions from the Change Table



The CAPE-Forecast Algorithm



Experimental Results



Related Work



Conclusions


References


Interrogation Methods and Terror Networks




Introduction



Related Literature



Model



Law Enforcement Agency



Information Structure



Payoffs



The Optimal Network



The Enforcement Agency



Investigation Budget Allocation



Legal Environment and Interrogation Methods



Extensions and Conclusions


References


Terrorists and Sponsors. An Inquiry into Trust and Double-Crossing




State-Terrorist Coalitions



The Mathematical Model



Equilibrium Strategies



Payoff to T



The Trust Factor



Interpretation



Conclusion. External Shocks


References


Simulating Terrorist Cells: Experiments and Mathematical Theory




Introduction



The Question of Theory versus Real-Life Applications



Design



Procedure312



Analysis and Conclusions


References



Game Theory


A Brinkmanship Game Theory Model of Terrorism




The Extensive Form of the Brinkmanship Game



Incentive Compatibility ("Credibility") Constraints



The Effectiveness Constraint



The Acceptability Constraint



Equilibrium Solution and Interpretation of the Results



Conclusion


References


Strategic Analysis of Terrorism




Introduction



Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements in the Study of Terrorism



Proactive Counterterrorism Measures



Defensive Conntermeasures: globalized Threat



Defensive Measures: No Collateral Damage



Intelligence



Other Cases



Terrorist Signaling: Backlash and Erosion Effects



Concluding Remarks


Undeerfunding in Terrorist organizations




Introduction



Motivation



Game



Actors



Model



Game Form



Actors



Results



Equilibrium Strategies



Comparative Statics



Discussion



Conclusion


References



History of the Conference on Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism


Personal Reflections on Beauty and Terror




Shadows Strike



The "Thinking Man's Game"



The Elephant: Politics



Toward a Mathematical Theory of Counterterrorism