| |
| |
| List of Figures | |
| |
| |
| List of Tables | |
| |
| |
| List of Games | |
| |
| |
| Preface | |
| |
| |
| Contents and Purpose | |
| |
| |
| Changes in the Second Edition, 1994 | |
| |
| |
| Changes in the Third Edition, 2001 | |
| |
| |
| Changes in the Fourth Edition, 2006 | |
| |
| |
| Using the Book | |
| |
| |
| The Level of Mathematics | |
| |
| |
| Other Books | |
| |
| |
| Contact Information | |
| |
| |
| Acknowledgements | |
| |
| |
| Introduction | |
| |
| |
| History | |
| |
| |
| Game Theory's Method | |
| |
| |
| Exemplifying Theory | |
| |
| |
| This Book's Style | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| |
| Game Theory | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Rules of the Game | |
| |
| |
| |
| Definitions | |
| |
| |
| |
| Dominated and Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemma | |
| |
| |
| |
| Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea | |
| |
| |
| |
| Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, the Battle of the Sexes, and Ranked Coordination | |
| |
| |
| |
| Focal Points | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: Fisheries (polished) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Information | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game | |
| |
| |
| |
| Information Sets | |
| |
| |
| |
| Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games | |
| |
| |
| |
| An Example: The Png Settlement Game | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: Bayes' Rule at the Bar (in between) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mixed and Continuous Strategies | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Payoff-equating Method and Games of Timing | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The Civic Duty Game | |
| |
| |
| |
| Randomizing Is Not Always Mixing: The Auditing Game | |
| |
| |
| |
| Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game | |
| |
| |
| |
| Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, and Strategic Substitutes | |
| |
| |
| |
| Existence of Equilibrium | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: The War of Attrition (polished) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information | |
| |
| |
| |
| Subgame Perfectness | |
| |
| |
| |
| An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I | |
| |
| |
| |
| Credible Threats, Sunks Costs, and the Open-set Problem in the Game of Nuisance Suits | |
| |
| |
| |
| Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto Perfection | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: U.S. Air for Sale (polished) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information | |
| |
| |
| |
| Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox | |
| |
| |
| |
| Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk Theorem | |
| |
| |
| |
| Reputation: The One-sided Prisoner's Dilemma | |
| |
| |
| |
| Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game | |
| |
| |
| |
| Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations: Customer Switching Costs | |
| |
| |
| |
| Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (in between) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information | |
| |
| |
| |
| Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III | |
| |
| |
| |
| Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Entry Deterrence and PhD Admissions Games | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V | |
| |
| |
| |
| Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The Gang of Four Model | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Axelrod Tournament | |
| |
| |
| |
| Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under Incomplete Information (improveable) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Asymmetric Information | |
| |
| |
| |
| Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions | |
| |
| |
| |
| Categories of Asymmetric Information Models | |
| |
| |
| |
| A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Game | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints | |
| |
| |
| |
| Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: Moral Hazard Contracts Game (improveable) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Further Topics in Moral Hazard | |
| |
| |
| |
| Efficiency Wages | |
| |
| |
| |
| Tournaments | |
| |
| |
| |
| Institutions and Agency Problems | |
| |
| |
| |
| Renegotiation: The Repossession Game | |
| |
| |
| |
| State-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II | |
| |
| |
| |
| Joint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Model | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Multitask Agency Problem | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: Lobbying Teams (polished) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Adverse Selection | |
| |
| |
| |
| Introduction: Production Game VI | |
| |
| |
| |
| Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II | |
| |
| |
| |
| Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons Il and IV | |
| |
| |
| |
| Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III | |
| |
| |
| |
| Market Microstructure | |
| |
| |
| |
| A Variety of Applications | |
| |
| |
| |
| Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Combined: Production Game VII | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: Adverse Selection in Stock Sales (improveable) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mechanism Design and Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge | |
| |
| |
| |
| Mechanisms, Unravelling, Cross Checking, and the Revelation Principle | |
| |
| |
| |
| Myerson Mechanism Design | |
| |
| |
| |
| An Example of Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge: The Salesman Game | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Groves Mechanism | |
| |
| |
| |
| Price Discrimination | |
| |
| |
| |
| Rate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurement | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: Regulatory Ratcheting (improveable) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Signaling | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling | |
| |
| |
| |
| Variants on the Signalling Model of Education | |
| |
| |
| |
| General Comments on Signalling in Education | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening | |
| |
| |
| |
| Two Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues | |
| |
| |
| |
| Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing | |
| |
| |
| |
| Countersignalling | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: Signalling Marriageability (improveable) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Applications | |
| |
| |
| |
| Bargaining | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Nash Bargaining Solution | |
| |
| |
| |
| Alternating Offers over Finite Time | |
| |
| |
| |
| Alternating Offers over Infinite Time | |
| |
| |
| |
| Incomplete Information | |
| |
| |
| |
| Setting Up a Way to Bargain: the Myerson-Satterthwaite Model | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: Labor Bargaining (polished) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
| Values Private and Common, Continuous and Discrete | |
| |
| |
| |
| Optimal Strategies under Different Rules in Private-value Auctions | |
| |
| |
| |
| Revenue Equivalence, Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty | |
| |
| |
| |
| Reserve Prices and the Marginal Revenue Approach | |
| |
| |
| |
| Common-value Auctions and the Winner's Curse | |
| |
| |
| |
| Asymmetric Equilibria, Affiliation, and Linkage: The Wallet Game | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: Auctions (polished) | |
| |
| |
| |
| Pricing | |
| |
| |
| |
| Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited | |
| |
| |
| |
| Capacity Constraints: The Edgeworth Paradox | |
| |
| |
| |
| Location Models | |
| |
| |
| |
| Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games | |
| |
| |
| |
| Vertical Differentiation | |
| |
| |
| |
| Durable Monopoly | |
| |
| |
| Notes | |
| |
| |
| Problems | |
| |
| |
| Classroom Game: The Kleit Oligopoly Game (polished) | |
| |
| |
| Mathematical Appendix | |
| |
| |
| |
| Notation | |
| |
| |
| |
| The Greek Alphabet | |
| |
| |
| |
| Glossary | |
| |
| |
| |
| Formulas and Functions | |
| |
| |
| |
| Probability Distributions | |
| |
| |
| |
| Supermodularity | |
| |
| |
| |
| Fixed Point Theorems | |
| |
| |
| |
| Genericity | |
| |
| |
| |
| Discounting | |
| |
| |
| |
| Risk | |
| |
| |
| References and Name Index | |
| |
| |
| Subject Index | |