Organization at the Limit Lessons from the Columbia Disaster

Name: Organization at the Limit Lessons from the Columbia Disaster
Price: 23.73 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9781405131087

ISBN-10: 140513108X

ISBN-13: 9781405131087

Edition: 2005

Authors: William Starbuck, Moshe Farjoun, Betty Barrett, Sally Blount, Richard Bohmer

List price: $60.00

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Description:

The book offers important insight relevant to Corporate, Government and Global organizations management in general. The internationally recognised authors tackle vital issues in decision making, how organizational risk is managed, how can technological and organizational complexities interact, what are the impediments for effective learning and how large, medium, and small organizations can, and in fact must, increase their resilience. Managers, organizational consultants, expert professionals, and training specialists; particularly those in high risk organizations, may find the issues covered in the book relevant to their daily work and a potential catalyst for thought and action. A…

Book details

List price: $60.00
Copyright year: 2005
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated
Publication date: 9/12/2005
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 416
Size: 7.00" wide x 10.00" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 2.156
Language: English



Notes on Contributors


Preface




Introduction



Introduction: Organizational Aspects of the Columbia Disaster



Synopsis: NASA, the CAIB Report, and the Columbia Disaster




The Context of the Disaster



History and Policy at the Space Shuttle Program




System Effects: On Slippery Slopes, Repeating Negative Patterns, and Learning from Mistake?




Organizational Learning and Action in the Midst of Safety Drift: Revisiting the Space Shuttle Program's Recent History




The Space Between in Space Transportation: A Relational Analysis of the Failure of STS-107




Influences on Decision-Making



The Opacity of Risk: Language and the Culture of Safety in NASA's Space Shuttle Program




Coping with Temporal Uncertainty: When Rigid, Ambitious Deadlines Don't Make Sense




Attention to Production Schedule and Safety as Determinants of Risk-Taking in NASA's Decision to Launch the Columbia Shuttle




The Imaging Debate



Making Sense of Blurred Images: Mindful Organizing in Mission STS-107




The Price of Progress: Structurally Induced Inaction




Data Indeterminacy: One NASA, Two Modes




The Recovery Window: Organizational Learning Following Ambiguous Threats




Barriers to the Interpretation and Diffusion of Information about Potential Problems in Organizations: Lessons from the Space Shuttle Columbia




Beyond Explanation



Systems Approaches to Safety: NASA and the Space Shuttle Disasters




Creating Foresight: Lessons for Enhancing Resilience from Columbia




Making NASA More Effective




Observations on the Columbia Accident




Conclusion



Lessons from the Columbia Disaster



Index of Citations


Subject Index