Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science

Name: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science
Price: 37.09 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9781405101523

ISBN-10: 1405101520

ISBN-13: 9781405101523

Edition: 2004

Authors: Christopher Hitchcock, Hans Halvorsson, James Robert Brown, Peter Carruthers, Fiona Cowie

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Description:

An accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary philosophy of science, including empiricism, confirmation, realism, laws, causation, explanation and the philosophies of physics, biology, psychology, and the social sciences.

Book details

List price: $64.95
Copyright year: 2004
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated
Publication date: 1/9/2004
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 368
Size: 6.70" wide x 9.74" long x 1.10" tall
Weight: 1.496
Language: English



Notes on Contributors


Preface


Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Science?


Do Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism?



Why Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism




Why Thought Experiments do not Transcend Empiricism



Does Probability Capture the Logic of Scientific Confirmation or Justification?



Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific Confirmation




Why Probability does not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification



Can a Theory's Predictive Success Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates?



A Theory's Predictive Success can Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates




A Theory's Predictive Success does not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities in Postulates



Are There Laws in the Social Sciences?



There are no Laws of the Social Sciences




There are Laws in the Social Sciences



Are Causes Physically Connected to their Effects?



Causes are Physically Connected to their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions are not Causes




Causes need not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation



Is There a Puzzle About the Low-Entropy Past?



On the Origins of the Arrow of Time: Why there is Still a Puzzle about the Low-Entropy Past




There is no Puzzle about the Low-Entropy Past



Do Genes Encode Information about Phenotypic Traits?



Genes Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits




Genes do not Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits



Is the Mind a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection?



The Mind is a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection




The Mind is not (just) a System of Modules Shaped (just) by Natural Selection



Index