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Preface | |
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Introduction | |
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Does Anyone Really Pay Attention to Dividends? (Or, Why Should I Care?) | |
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A Short History of Dividend Policy | |
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Summary of the Evolution of Dividends | |
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Profits, Dividends, and Capital Expenditures | |
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Dividend Returns versus Total Common Stock Returns | |
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Dividend Yields | |
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Dividend Declaration | |
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The Dividend Puzzle | |
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Where We Are Headed | |
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Stock Valuation | |
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Capital Gains versus Dividends | |
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Stylized Examples of the Impact of Investment Horizon | |
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The Case of Four One-Year Owners | |
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The Case of One Four-Year Owner | |
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Summary | |
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Common Stock Valuation Example | |
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Dividend Policy and Share Price | |
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Common Stock Valuation Model | |
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Dividend Policy and Owners' Wealth | |
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What We Really Mean | |
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Stylized Examples of Residual and Managed Dividend Policies | |
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Dividend Policy and the Miller/Modigliani Conclusion | |
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The MandM Intuition | |
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What if the share price drops by less than the extra dividend paid? | |
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What if the share price drops by more than the extra dividend paid? | |
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The Dividend Policy Controversy | |
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Dividend Policy and Owners' Wealth | |
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Miller and Modigliani | |
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Perfect Capital Markets (PCM) | |
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Dividend Policy under PCM and Certainty | |
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Dividend Policy under PCM and Uncertainty | |
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Summary of Dividend Policy under PCM | |
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An Introduction to Imperfect Capital Markets | |
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Homemade Dividends and Costless Financing | |
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Transaction Costs | |
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Qualifications on the Impact of Transaction Costs | |
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Flotation Costs | |
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Behavioral Explanations for Dividend Policy Relevance | |
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Conclusions | |
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Dividends and Taxes | |
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The Tax Environment | |
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Dividend Yields and Risk-Adjusted Returns | |
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The Theory | |
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The Evidence | |
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The Black-Scholes Experiment | |
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The Litzenberger and Ramaswamy Experiment | |
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BandS versus LandR | |
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The Miller and Scholes Critique | |
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The Ex-Dividend Day Studies | |
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The Theory | |
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The Evidence | |
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Ex-Dividend Day and Cross-Sectional Studies | |
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The LandR Experiment Revisited: Time Series or Cross-Sectional Return Variations? | |
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Tax Effects and Time Series Return Variations | |
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Tax-Induced Clienteles: Empirical Evidence | |
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Implications of Ex-Dividend Day Studies | |
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The Case of Citizens Utilities | |
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Conclusions | |
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Dividend Policy and Agency Problems | |
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Agency Relationships | |
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Agency Relationships and Dividends | |
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Shareholders versus Debt Holders | |
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The Differential Impact of Dividends | |
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Dividend Restrictions | |
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Similar Conflicts | |
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Shareholders versus Managers | |
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Ownership versus Control | |
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The Easterbrook Analysis | |
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The Jensen Analysis | |
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Managerial Compensation | |
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Empirical Evidence on Agency Problems and Dividends | |
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Shareholders and Debt Holders | |
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Shareholders and Managers | |
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Conclusions | |
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The Differential Impact of Dividends on Shareholders and Bondholders | |
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Dividend Policy and Asymmetric Information | |
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Perfect Capital Markets and Information | |
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Signaling Models | |
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Signaling with Dividends | |
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Numeric Examples | |
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"Better" Firm--No Dividend Case | |
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"Better" Firm--Dividend Case | |
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"Poorer" Firm--No Dividend Case | |
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"Poorer" Firm--Dividend Case | |
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Summary | |
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John and Williams Model | |
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Bhattacharya Model | |
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Miller and Rock Model | |
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Other Theoretical Models | |
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Dividend Smoothing | |
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Dividends versus Share Repurchases | |
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Choice of Signals | |
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Empirical Evidence | |
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Announcement Effects | |
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Changes in Market Expectations | |
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Predictions of Future Earnings | |
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Dividend Signaling Considering Investment Opportunities and Insider Trading | |
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Lang and Litzenberger Study | |
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John and Lang Study | |
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Conclusions | |
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Corporate Dividend Policy Decisions | |
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Dividend Patterns of Individual Firms | |
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The Lintner Survey | |
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A Dividend Change Example | |
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The Lintner Model | |
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The Impact of Dividend Policy on Investment | |
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Dividend Patterns of Individual Firms Revisited | |
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Subsequent Dividend Model Research | |
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Conclusions | |
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Dividend Policy: The Global Perspective | |
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Descriptive Statistics on Dividend Policies around the World | |
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Dividend Size and Frequency | |
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Institutional Features | |
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Tax Differences | |
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Dividend Payout Patterns around the World | |
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Taxes and Dividend Payout Policies in Various Countries | |
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Share-Price Behavior around Ex-Dividend Days | |
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Other Tests for the Tax Effect | |
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Conflict of Interest, Information, and Payout Policy | |
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Conclusions | |
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Common Stock Repurchases: An Alternative to Dividends | |
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Motives for Common Stock Repurchases versus Dividend Payments | |
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Similar Motives | |
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Dissimilar Motives | |
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Survey Results on Common Stock Repurchases | |
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Methods of Common Stock Repurchases | |
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Fixed-Price Tender Offers | |
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Open-Market Repurchases | |
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Dutch-Auction Repurchases | |
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Transferable Put-Rights Distributions | |
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Targeted Stock Repurchases | |
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Trends in Common Stock Repurchases | |
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Tax Issues in Share Repurchases versus Dividend Payments | |
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Theoretical Implications of Share Repurchases | |
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Signaling Models | |
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Takeover Defenses | |
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The Empirical Evidence on Share Repurchases | |
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Announcement Period Returns | |
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Share Repurchases as a Signaling Mechanism | |
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Corporate Control Issues | |
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Share Repurchase Interpretations | |
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Conclusions | |
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Management Implications and Conclusions | |
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What Do Managers Think about Dividend Policy? | |
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What Do We Think about Dividend Policy? | |
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The "Balance Scale" of Dividend Relevance | |
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The Competing Frictions Model | |
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Individual Market Imperfections | |
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Taxes | |
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Agency Costs | |
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Asymmetric Information | |
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Transaction Costs | |
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Flotation Costs | |
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Behavioral Considerations | |
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Interactions of Market Imperfections | |
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Strategies in Dealing with Market Imperfections | |
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An Example of Competing Frictions Resolution | |
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A Dividend Life Cycle Example | |
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Conclusions | |
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References | |
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Credits | |
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Index | |