Economic Approach to Law

ISBN-10: 0804746559

ISBN-13: 9780804746557

Edition: 2004

Authors: Thomas J. Miceli

List price: $95.00
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The economic approach to law has developed into a mainstream field of study for both legal scholars and economists. This book provides a textbook treatment of the subject, primarily directed toward undergraduate economics students.
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Book details

List price: $95.00
Copyright year: 2004
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Publication date: 11/11/2003
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 408
Size: 7.50" wide x 9.25" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 1.848

Thomas J. Miceli received his PhD in Economics from Brown University, USA, in 1988, and he has been Professor at the University of Connecticut, USA, since 1987. His research is largely in the area of law and economics, with particular emphasis on land use and property law. He is a recognized authority on the economics of eminent domain, a subject on which he has authored or co-authored three books. He has also published undergraduate and graduate level textbooks on law and economics. Currently, he serves as an associate editor for the International Review of Law and Economics. While at UConn, he has taught courses at both the undergraduate and graduate levels in microeconomic theory, urban economics, public finance, and law and economics, and in 2009, he won the Grillo Family Faculty Award for Excellence in Teaching in the Economics Department.

List of Tables and Figures
Introductory Concepts
What is Law and Economics?
Positive and Normative Analysis
Is Efficiency a Valid Norm for Evaluating Law?
Efficiency Concepts
Pareto Efficiency
Potential Pareto Efficiency, or Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
Consensual Versus Nonconsensual Exchange
The Coase Theorem
The Law in "Law and Economics"
The Nature of the Common Law
The Court System in the United States
Discussion Questions
Review of Microeconomics
The Theory of the Consumer and Market Demand
The Theory of the Firm and Market Supply
Market Equilibrium
Perfect Competition
Oligopoly and Game Theory
Welfare Economics
Welfare Theorems
Market Failure
Uncertainty and Imperfect Information
Choice Under Uncertainty and Insurance
Moral Hazard
Adverse Selection
An Economic Model of Tort Law
What Is a Tort?
The Social Function of Tort Law
Elements of a Tort Claim
Proximate Cause
Liability Rules
An Economic Model of Accidents: The Model of Precaution
The Unilateral Care Model
Social Optimum
Actual Care Choice by the Injurer
Comparison of Strict Liability and Negligence
Bilateral Care Model
No Liability and Strict Liability
The Hand Rule
The Reasonable-Person Standard
Contributory Negligence
Negligence with Contributory Negligence
Strict Liability with Contributory Negligence
Further Topics
Sequential Care Accidents
The Injurer Moves First
The Victim Moves First
Last Clear Chance
Comparative Negligence
Causation and Liability
Proximate Cause
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Uncertainty over Causation
Activity Levels
Punitive Damages
The Judgment-Proof Problem
The Impact of Liability Insurance
Litigation Costs
Legal Error
The Statute of Limitations for Tort Suits
Intentional Torts
Valuing Human Life and Safety
Discussion Questions
Applying the Economic Model of Tort Law
Products Liability
A Brief History of Products Liability Law
An Economic Model of Products Liability
Equilibrium Price and Output for a Dangerous Product
Care Choices by Manufacturers and Consumers
Consumer Perceptions of Risk
A Note on Custom as a Defense
Recent Trends
Evidence on the Impact of Products Liability Laws
Concluding Remarks
Workplace Accidents
Respondeat Superior
Accidents in which the Victim Is an Employee
Workers' Compensation Laws
Liability for Environmental Damages
Characteristics of Environmental Accidents
Multiple Victims
Causal Uncertainty
Case Study: Asbestos
Medical Malpractice
Customary Practice and Informed Consent
Do Physicians Practice Defensive Medicine?
Discussion Questions
The Economics of Contract Law I: The Elements of a Valid Contract
Contracts and Efficient Exchange
The Elements of a Valid Contract
Reasons for Invalidating Contracts
Mental Incapacity or Incompetence
Coercion or Duress
Mistake and the Duty to Disclose Private Information
Purely Distributive Information
Socially Valuable Information
Casual Versus Deliberate Acquisition of Information
Disclosure of Unfavorable Information
Discussion Questions
The Economics of Contract Law II: Remedies for Breach
The Efficient Breach Model
Money Damages and Efficient Breach
Incentives for Efficient Reliance
Mitigation of Damages
Impossibility and Related Excuses
Efficient Risk Sharing
Commercial Impracticability
Specific Performance
Transaction Costs
Subjective Value and Efficient Breach
The Value of Consent
Self-Enforcement of Contracts
Liquidated Damage Clauses
Product Warranties*
Express Warranties
Implied Warranties
Long-Term Contracts*
Discussion Questions
The Economics of Property Law: Fundamentals
The Nature and Function of Property Rights
The Definition of Property Rights
Property Rights and Incentives
The Emergency of Property Rights
Enforcement of Property Rights
Fundamentals of the Economics of Property Law
The Coase Theorem
The Assignment of Rights and the Distribution of Wealth
Examples of the Coase Theorem
The Role of Transaction Costs
Enforcement of Property Rights
Property Rules and Liability Rules
The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules
Trespass and Nuisance
The General Transaction Structure
Consensual Transfers of Property
The Legal Protection of Ownership
Should the Law Protect the Possessor or the Claimant? An Analysis of Land Title Systems*
Land Title Systems: Recording Versus Registration
Land Title Systems in the United States
Title Protection and Economic Development
Limited and Divided Ownership
The Lease: A Contract or Conveyance?
Mitigation in Leases
The Law of Waste
Private Versus Group Ownership
The Optimal Scale of Ownership
Public Goods
The Anticommons Problem and the Right to Partition*
Time-Limited Property Rights: Intellectual Property
Discussion Questions
Involuntary Transfers and Regulation of Property
Involuntary Transfers and Restrictions on Transfers Between Private Parties
Adverse Possession
The Mistaken Improver Problem*
Inheritance Rules
The Rule Against Perpetuities
Government Acquisition of Property Under Eminent Domain
The Eminent Domain Clause
Public Use and the Scope of the Takings Power
The Meaning of Just Compensation
Case Study on the Determination of Just Compensation: "The Assassin's Bequest"
Eminent Domain and Land Use Incentives
The No-Compensation Result
Arguments Against the No-Compensation Result
Government Regulation of Property
The Compensation Question
Tests for Compensation
An Economic Model of Regulatory Takings
Implications of the Efficient Compensation Rule
Investment-Backed Expectations: Does the Market Eliminate the Need for Compensation?*
Regulation Versus the Common Law
Discussion Questions
The Economics of Dispute Resolution
The Litigation Process
Why Do Trials Occur?
The Differing Perceptions, or Optimism Model
The Asymmetric Information Model
The Social Versus Private Incentive to Sue
Procedural Rules and Litigation Costs
The English Versus American Rule
The English Rule and Settlement
The English Rule and the Incentive to File Suit
Evidence on the Impact of the English Rule
Rule 68
Contingent Fees
The Benefits of Contingent Fees
Contingent Fees and Settlement
Do Contingent Fees Promote Frivolous Suits?
Frivolous Suits
Court Delay
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Evolution of the Law
Selection of Disputes for Trial
Is the Common Law Efficient?
Empirical Evidence on Legal Change
Judicial Decision Making and Legal Change
Decision by Precedent
An Economic Model of Precedent
Precedents as a Stock of Knowledge
Procedural Responses to Legal Errors
The Standard of Proof
Appeals as a Means of Error Correction
What Do Judges Maximize?
Judicial Self-Interest and the Law
Pragmatism and the Economic Approach to Law
Discussion Questions
The Economics of Crime
Distinguishing Crimes and Torts
Crimes Are Intentional
Other Reasons for Public Enforcement
Examples of Private Enforcement
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Criminal Sanctions
The Economic Model of Crime
The Offender's Decision to Commit a Crime and the Supply of Offenses
Optimal Punishment
The Optimal Fine
Gain Versus Harm-Based Fines
Fines and Imprisonment
Prison, Probation, and Parole
The Probability of Apprehension Is Variable
Why Are Fines Not Equal to Offenders' Wealth?
Repeat Offenders
Empirical Evidence on the Economic Model of Crime
The Death Penalty
Economics of the Death Penalty
Constitutional Issues
The Bail System
Private Protection
Plea Bargaining
Economic Models of Plea Bargaining
Plea Bargaining and Deterrence
A Comparative Perspective
Crime and the Business Cycle
Gun Laws and Crime
Primitive Law Enforcement
Some Constitutional Issues
Free Speech
The Rule Against Self-Incrimination
The Right of Privacy
Discussion Questions
Answers to In-Chapter Exercises
Works Cited
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