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Acknowledgments | |
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Abbreviations | |
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Introduction | |
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The Evolution of Terrorism as a Strategic Threat | |
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A Word About Scope and Terms | |
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The Conceptual Framework | |
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Case Selection | |
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Overview of Chapters | |
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Decapitation: Catching or Killing the Leader | |
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what decapitation Means | |
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The Arrest of Top Leaders | |
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Abimael Guzman and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) | |
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Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Workers' Party | |
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Mickey McKevitt and the Real Irish Republican Army | |
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Shoko Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo | |
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Assassination or "Targeted Killing" | |
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The Philippines' Abu Sayyaf | |
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Russia and Chechen Leaders | |
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Israel's "Targeted Killings" | |
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How Decapitation Ends Terrorism | |
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Negotiations: Transition toward a Legitimate Political Process | |
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why Government Negotiate | |
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Why Groups Negotiate | |
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Case Studies of Negotiations | |
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The Northern Ireland Peace Process | |
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Analysis of the Agreement | |
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The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process | |
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Terrorism and the Talks | |
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The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or Tamil Tigers) | |
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Analysis of the Failure | |
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Promising and Unpromising Circumstances for Negotiation | |
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Stalemate | |
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Strong Leadership | |
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Sponsors | |
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Suicide Campaigns | |
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Splintering | |
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Spoilers | |
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Setting and Story | |
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How Negotiations End Terrorism | |
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Success: Achieving the Objective | |
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What Does "Success" Mean? | |
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Survival | |
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Achievement of Objectives | |
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Perpetuating Terrorism: Tactical or "Process" Goals | |
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Ending Terrorism: Strategic or"Outcome" Goals | |
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Cases of Success | |
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Irgun Zvai Le'umi (Irgun or IZL) | |
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The African National Congress and Umkhonto | |
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Other Notable Cases | |
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How Success Ends Terrorism | |
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Conclusion | |
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Failure: Imploding, Provoking a Backlash, or Becoming Marginalized | |
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Implosion: Mistakes, Burnout, and Collapse | |
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Failure to Pass the Cause to the Next Generation | |
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Generational Patterns: Left-Wing Groups In The 1970S | |
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Generational Patterns: Right-Wing Groups In The 1990S | |
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Infighting and Fractionalization | |
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Loss of Operational Control | |
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Accepting an Exit | |
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Marginalization: Diminishing Popular Support | |
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The Ideology Becomes Irrelevant | |
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Loss of Contact with "the People" | |
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Targeting Errors and Backlash | |
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How Failure Ends Terrorism | |
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Repression: Crushing Terrorism with Force | |
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Analyzing The Strategies of Terrorism | |
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Case Studies of Repression | |
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Russia and Narodnaya Volya | |
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Peru and Sendero Luminoso | |
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Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party | |
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Uruguay and the Tupamaros | |
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Russia and Chechnya | |
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Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, 1928-1966 | |
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How Repression Ends Terrorism | |
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Reorientation: Transitioning to Another Modus Operandi | |
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Criminality and Terrorism | |
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Colombia and the FARC | |
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The Philippines and Abu Sayyaf | |
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Insurgency and Terrorism | |
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Algeria and the G1A | |
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Terrorism as a Catalyst for Major War | |
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India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri Separatist Groups | |
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Outdates Paradigms, Practical Implications | |
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How War Ends Terrorism | |
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How Al-Qaeda Ends: The Relevance and Irrelevance of History | |
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Is Al-Qaeda Unique? | |
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Resilient Structure | |
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Methods of Radicalization and Recruitment | |
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Means of Support | |
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Means of Communication | |
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The Relevance and Irrelevance of History for Al-Qaeda: Applying the Framework | |
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Decapitation:Capturing or Killing the Leaders | |
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Negotiations: Talking to Al-Qaeda or Its Associates | |
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Success: Achieving Al-Qaeda's Objectives | |
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Failure through Implosion | |
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Failure through Diminishment of Popular Support | |
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Repression: Crushing Al-Qaeda with Force | |
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Reorientation: Transitioning to Other Means | |
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Al-Qaeda's Decline and Demise | |
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Conclusion | |
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Understanding How Terrorism Ends | |
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Appendix: Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Campaigns | |
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Notes | |
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Selected Bibliography | |
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Index | |