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List of Tables and Figures | |
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Preface and Acknowledgments | |
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Introduction: Statesmen, Partisans, and Geopolitics | |
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The Two Faces of Grand Strategy | |
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Statesmen as Strategic Politicians | |
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Grand Strategy Past and Present | |
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Grand Strategy's Microfoundations | |
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Variations in Grand Strategy | |
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A Model of Executive Choice | |
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Determinants of Grand Strategy | |
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Research Design and Outline | |
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Why States Appease Their Foes | |
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The Appeasement Puzzle | |
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George Washington and the Appeasement of Britain | |
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Britain, and the Confederacy | |
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Hitler, and Appeasement, 1936-1939 | |
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Appeasement Reconsidered | |
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When States Expand | |
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Theories of Expansionism | |
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Republican Factionalism, and the Monroe Doctrine | |
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Cuba, and the Threat of Domestic Populism | |
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September 11, and the Promise of Party Realignment | |
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Expansionism: Necessity or Choice? | |
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Why States Underreach | |
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Strategies of Restraint | |
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Jacksonian Fissures and Martin Van Buren's Strategic Adjustment | |
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Herbert Hoover, Republican Sectarianism, and Strategic Retrenchment | |
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Bill Clinton, the Democrats, and Selective Engagement | |
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The Paradox of Strategic "Underextension" | |
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Conclusion: Statecraft's Twin Engines | |
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American Balancing in Historical Perspective | |
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Geopolitics and Partisan Politics: Managing Cross-Pressure | |
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Secondary Powers and Nondemocracies | |
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Barack Obama and Grand Strategy | |
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References | |
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Index | |