Behavioral Game Theory Experiments in Strategic Interaction

Name: Behavioral Game Theory Experiments in Strategic Interaction
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780691090399

ISBN-10: 0691090394

ISBN-13: 9780691090399

Edition: 2003

Authors: Colin F. Camerer

List price: $130.00

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Description:

Game theory began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored how average people with limited foresight actually play games. This text develops mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing and learning, which help predict what people and companies will do.

Book details

List price: $130.00
Copyright year: 2003
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication date: 3/17/2003
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 568
Size: 6.46" wide x 9.53" long x 1.70" tall
Weight: 2.288
Language: English



Preface



Introduction



What is Game Theory Good For?



Three Examples



Experimental Regularity and Behavioral Game Theory



Basic Game Theory



Experimental Design



Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games



Ultimatum and Dictator Games: Basic Results



Methodological Variables



Demographic Variables



Culture



Descriptive Variables: Labeling and Context



Structural Variables



Trust Games



Theory



Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium



Early Studies



Modern Studies



Subjective Randomization and Mixed Strategies



Explicit Randomization



Patent Race and Location Games with Mixed Equilibria



Two Field Studies



Bargaining



Unstructured Bargaining



Structured Bargaining



Bargaining under Incomplete Information



Dominance-Solvable Games



Simple Dominance-Solvable Games



Beauty Contest Games



Games in Which Iterated Reasoning Decreases Payoffs



When More Iteration is Better: The "Dirty Faces" Game



The "Groucho Marx" Theorem in Zero-Sum Betting



Structural Models of Decision Rules and Levels of Reasoning



Theories



Raw Choices in Email Game and Additional Data



Learning



Theories of Learning



Reinforcement Learning



Belief Learning



Imitation Learning



Comparative Studies



Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) Learning



Rule Learning



Econometric Studies of Estimation Properties



Coordination



Matching Games



Asymmetric Players: Battle of the Sexes



Market Entry Games



Payoff-Asymmetric Order-Statistic Games



Selecting Selection Principles



Applications: Path-Dependence, Market Adoption, and Corporate Culture



Psycholinguistics



Signaling and Reputation



Simple Signaling Games and Adaptive Dynamics



Specialized Signaling Games



Reputation Formation



Conclusion: What Do We Know, and Where Do We Go?



Summary of Results



Top Ten Open Research Questions



Design Details


References


Index