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Static Games of Complete Information | |
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Basic Theory: Narmal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium | |
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Normal-Form Representation of Games | |
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Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies | |
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Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibriuin | |
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Applications | |
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Cournot Model of Duopoly | |
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Bertrand Model of Duopoly | |
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Final-Offer Arbitration | |
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The Problem of the Commons | |
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Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibriutn | |
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Mixed Strategies | |
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Existence of Nash Equilibrium | |
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Dynamic Games of Complete Information | |
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Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information | |
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Theory: Backwards Induction | |
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Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm | |
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Sequential Bargaining | |
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Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information | |
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Theory: Subgame Perfection | |
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Bank Runs | |
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Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition | |
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Tournaments | |
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Repeated Games | |
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Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games | |
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Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games | |
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Collusion between Cournot Duopolists | |
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Efficiency Wages | |
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Time-Consistent Monetary Policy | |
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Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information | |
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Extensive-Form Representation of Games | |
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Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibriuin | |
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Static Games of Incomplete Information | |
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Theory: Static Bayesian Ganies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium | |
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An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information | |
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Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games | |
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Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium | |
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Applications | |
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Mixed Strategies Revisited | |
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An Auction | |
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A Double Auction | |
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The Revelation Principle | |
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Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information | |
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Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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Signaling Games | |
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Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games | |
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Job-Market Signaling | |
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Corporate Investment and Capital Structure | |
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Monetary Policy | |
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Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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Cheap-Talk Games | |
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Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information | |
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Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemnia | |
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Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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Index | |