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Game Theory and the Law

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ISBN-10: 0674341112

ISBN-13: 9780674341111

Edition: 1994

Authors: Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, Randal C. Picker

List price: $49.00
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Game Theory and the Law promises to be the definitive guide to the field. It provides a highly sophisticated yet exceptionally clear explanation of game theory, with a host of applications to legal issues. The authors have not only synthesized the existing scholarship, but also created the foundation for the next generation of research in law and economics."
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Book details

List price: $49.00
Copyright year: 1994
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Publication date: 9/1/1998
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 344
Size: 6.13" wide x 9.25" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.276
Language: English

Douglas G. Baird is Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School.

Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior
Bibliographic Notes
Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game
The Normal Form Game
Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes
The Nash Equilibrium
Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior
Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance
Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game
The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria
Bibliographic Notes
Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game
The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction
A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment
Subgame Perfection
Bibliographic Notes
Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation
Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept
Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling
Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of
Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation
Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate
Bibliographic Notes
Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information
Signaling and Screening
Modeling Nonverifiable Information
Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules
Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules
Screening and the Role of Legal Rules
Bibliographic Notes
Reputation and Repeated Games
Backwards Induction and Its Limits
Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems
Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation
Bibliographic Notes
Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models
Collective Action and the Role of Law
Embedded Games
Understanding the Structure of Large Games
Collective Action and Private Information
Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking
Herd Behavior
Bibliographic Notes
Noncooperative Bargaining
Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade
Legal Rules as Exit Options
Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations
Collective Bargaining and Exit Options
Bibliographic Notes
Bargaining and Information
Basic Models of the Litigation Process
Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages
Information and Selection Bias
Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information
Bibliographic Notes
Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law