| |
| |
Preface | |
| |
| |
Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior | |
| |
| |
Bibliographic Notes | |
| |
| |
Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game | |
| |
| |
The Normal Form Game | |
| |
| |
Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes | |
| |
| |
The Nash Equilibrium | |
| |
| |
Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior | |
| |
| |
Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance | |
| |
| |
Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game | |
| |
| |
The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria | |
| |
| |
Summary | |
| |
| |
Bibliographic Notes | |
| |
| |
Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game | |
| |
| |
The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction | |
| |
| |
A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment | |
| |
| |
Subgame Perfection | |
| |
| |
Summary | |
| |
| |
Bibliographic Notes | |
| |
| |
Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation | |
| |
| |
Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept | |
| |
| |
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept | |
| |
| |
Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result | |
| |
| |
Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling | |
| |
| |
Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of | |
| |
| |
Renegotiation | |
| |
| |
Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation | |
| |
| |
Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate | |
| |
| |
Summary | |
| |
| |
Bibliographic Notes | |
| |
| |
Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information | |
| |
| |
Signaling and Screening | |
| |
| |
Modeling Nonverifiable Information | |
| |
| |
Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules | |
| |
| |
Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules | |
| |
| |
Screening and the Role of Legal Rules | |
| |
| |
Summary | |
| |
| |
Bibliographic Notes | |
| |
| |
Reputation and Repeated Games | |
| |
| |
Backwards Induction and Its Limits | |
| |
| |
Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems | |
| |
| |
Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation | |
| |
| |
Summary | |
| |
| |
Bibliographic Notes | |
| |
| |
Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models | |
| |
| |
Collective Action and the Role of Law | |
| |
| |
Embedded Games | |
| |
| |
Understanding the Structure of Large Games | |
| |
| |
Collective Action and Private Information | |
| |
| |
Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking | |
| |
| |
Herd Behavior | |
| |
| |
Summary | |
| |
| |
Bibliographic Notes | |
| |
| |
Noncooperative Bargaining | |
| |
| |
Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade | |
| |
| |
Legal Rules as Exit Options | |
| |
| |
Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations | |
| |
| |
Collective Bargaining and Exit Options | |
| |
| |
Summary | |
| |
| |
Bibliographic Notes | |
| |
| |
Bargaining and Information | |
| |
| |
Basic Models of the Litigation Process | |
| |
| |
Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages | |
| |
| |
Information and Selection Bias | |
| |
| |
Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information | |
| |
| |
Summary | |
| |
| |
Bibliographic Notes | |
| |
| |
Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law | |
| |
| |
Notes | |
| |
| |
References | |
| |
| |
Glossary | |
| |
| |
Index | |