List of Figures | p. x |
List of Tables | p. xiii |
List of Games | p. xv |
Preface | p. xviii |
Contents and Purpose | p. xviii |
Changes in the Second Edition, 1994 | p. xviii |
Changes in the Third Edition, 2001 | p. xix |
Changes in the Fourth Edition, 2006 | p. xx |
Using the Book | p. xxii |
The Level of Mathematics | p. xxii |
Other Books | p. xxiii |
Contact Information | p. xxviii |
Acknowledgements | p. xxviii |
Introduction | p. 1 |
History | p. 1 |
Game Theory's Method | p. 2 |
Exemplifying Theory | p. 2 |
This Book's Style | p. 4 |
Notes | p. 6 |
Game Theory | p. 9 |
The Rules of the Game | p. 11 |
Definitions | p. 11 |
Dominated and Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemma | p. 19 |
Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea | p. 22 |
Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, the Battle of the Sexes, and Ranked Coordination | p. 26 |
Focal Points | p. 32 |
Notes | p. 33 |
Problems | p. 36 |
Classroom Game: Fisheries (polished) | p. 39 |
Information | p. 40 |
The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game | p. 40 |
Information Sets | p. 45 |
Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information | p. 49 |
The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games | p. 52 |
An Example: The Png Settlement Game | p. 61 |
Notes | p. 64 |
Problems | p. 66 |
Classroom Game: Bayes' Rule at the Bar (in between) | p. 68 |
Mixed and Continuous Strategies | p. 69 |
Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game | p. 69 |
The Payoff-equating Method and Games of Timing | p. 74 |
Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The Civic Duty Game | p. 81 |
Randomizing Is Not Always Mixing: The Auditing Game | p. 85 |
Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game | p. 87 |
Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, and Strategic Substitutes | p. 90 |
Existence of Equilibrium | p. 95 |
Notes | p. 98 |
Problems | p. 103 |
Classroom Game: The War of Attrition (polished) | p. 107 |
Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information | p. 108 |
Subgame Perfectness | p. 108 |
An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I | p. 111 |
Credible Threats, Sunks Costs, and the Open-set Problem in the Game of Nuisance Suits | p. 113 |
Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto Perfection | p. 120 |
Notes | p. 122 |
Problems | p. 123 |
Classroom Game: U.S. Air for Sale (polished) | p. 126 |
Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information | p. 128 |
Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox | p. 128 |
Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk Theorem | p. 130 |
Reputation: The One-sided Prisoner's Dilemma | p. 136 |
Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game | p. 137 |
Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations: Customer Switching Costs | p. 141 |
Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game | p. 143 |
Notes | p. 147 |
Problems | p. 151 |
Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (in between) | p. 155 |
Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information | p. 156 |
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III | p. 156 |
Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Entry Deterrence and PhD Admissions Games | p. 160 |
The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V | p. 164 |
Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The Gang of Four Model | p. 166 |
The Axelrod Tournament | p. 169 |
Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model | p. 170 |
Notes | p. 172 |
Problems | p. 175 |
Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under Incomplete Information (improveable) | p. 177 |
Asymmetric Information | p. 179 |
Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions | p. 181 |
Categories of Asymmetric Information Models | p. 181 |
A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Game | p. 184 |
The Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints | p. 194 |
Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game | p. 195 |
Notes | p. 201 |
Problems | p. 204 |
Classroom Game: Moral Hazard Contracts Game (improveable) | p. 210 |
Further Topics in Moral Hazard | p. 211 |
Efficiency Wages | p. 211 |
Tournaments | p. 214 |
Institutions and Agency Problems | p. 216 |
Renegotiation: The Repossession Game | p. 219 |
State-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II | p. 222 |
Joint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Model | p. 227 |
The Multitask Agency Problem | p. 230 |
Notes | p. 236 |
Problems | p. 239 |
Classroom Game: Lobbying Teams (polished) | p. 242 |
Adverse Selection | p. 243 |
Introduction: Production Game VI | p. 243 |
Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II | p. 249 |
Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons Il and IV | p. 252 |
Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III | p. 255 |
Market Microstructure | p. 259 |
A Variety of Applications | p. 263 |
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Combined: Production Game VII | p. 266 |
Notes | p. 269 |
Problems | p. 272 |
Classroom Game: Adverse Selection in Stock Sales (improveable) | p. 275 |
Mechanism Design and Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge | p. 276 |
Mechanisms, Unravelling, Cross Checking, and the Revelation Principle | p. 276 |
Myerson Mechanism Design | p. 287 |
An Example of Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge: The Salesman Game | p. 289 |
The Groves Mechanism | p. 293 |
Price Discrimination | p. 296 |
Rate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurement | p. 304 |
Notes | p. 314 |
Problems | p. 316 |
Classroom Game: Regulatory Ratcheting (improveable) | p. 319 |
Signaling | p. 320 |
The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling | p. 320 |
Variants on the Signalling Model of Education | p. 324 |
General Comments on Signalling in Education | p. 329 |
The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening | p. 330 |
Two Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues | p. 338 |
Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing | p. 341 |
Countersignalling | p. 345 |
Notes | p. 348 |
Problems | p. 349 |
Classroom Game: Signalling Marriageability (improveable) | p. 353 |
Applications | p. 355 |
Bargaining | p. 357 |
The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie | p. 357 |
The Nash Bargaining Solution | p. 359 |
Alternating Offers over Finite Time | p. 361 |
Alternating Offers over Infinite Time | p. 362 |
Incomplete Information | p. 365 |
Setting Up a Way to Bargain: the Myerson-Satterthwaite Model | p. 369 |
Notes | p. 380 |
Problems | p. 381 |
Classroom Game: Labor Bargaining (polished) | p. 384 |
Auctions | p. 385 |
Values Private and Common, Continuous and Discrete | p. 385 |
Optimal Strategies under Different Rules in Private-value Auctions | p. 390 |
Revenue Equivalence, Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty | p. 403 |
Reserve Prices and the Marginal Revenue Approach | p. 409 |
Common-value Auctions and the Winner's Curse | p. 414 |
Asymmetric Equilibria, Affiliation, and Linkage: The Wallet Game | p. 423 |
Notes | p. 428 |
Problems | p. 430 |
Classroom Game: Auctions (polished) | p. 432 |
Pricing | p. 433 |
Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited | p. 433 |
Capacity Constraints: The Edgeworth Paradox | p. 436 |
Location Models | p. 441 |
Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games | p. 449 |
Vertical Differentiation | p. 454 |
Durable Monopoly | p. 461 |
Notes | p. 467 |
Problems | p. 469 |
Classroom Game: The Kleit Oligopoly Game (polished) | p. 472 |
Mathematical Appendix | p. 473 |
Notation | p. 473 |
The Greek Alphabet | p. 475 |
Glossary | p. 475 |
Formulas and Functions | p. 479 |
Probability Distributions | p. 480 |
Supermodularity | p. 482 |
Fixed Point Theorems | p. 484 |
Genericity | p. 485 |
Discounting | p. 486 |
Risk | p. 487 |
References and Name Index | p. 493 |
Subject Index | p. 521 |
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