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Federalism and the Market Intergovernmental Conflict and Economic Reform in the Developing World

ISBN-10: 0521843812

ISBN-13: 9780521843812

Edition: 2005

Authors: Erik Wibbels

List price: $113.00
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Description:

This research develops a new comparative model of intergovernmental bargaining to account for variation in the capacity of federations in the developing world to undertake economic policy reform, suggesting that many market reform policies are a function of a constant process of bargaining between national and regional leaders struggling for political survival. As the degree of national-regional disagreement mounts, collective action on reforms that require implementation at multiple levels of government becomes more difficult. The degree to which the two factors conflict depends on four factors: the individual electoral interests, a shared intergovernmental fiscal system, the manner in which regional interests are represented in national policy making, and the levers of partisan influence national leaders have over subnational politicians. In testing the argument with combination of cross-sectional time-series and case study analysis, this book contributes to the broad literatures on development and the comparative political economy of federalism and decentralization.
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Book details

List price: $113.00
Copyright year: 2005
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 5/2/2005
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 290
Size: 6.50" wide x 9.50" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 1.144
Language: English

Acknowledgments
Intergovernmental Bargaining and Economic Policy in Federations
From Market-Preserving to Market-Distorting Federalism: Divergent Incentives and Economic Reform in Developing Nations
Federalism and the Decentralized Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance
Testing the Model: Macroeconomic Reform Beyond the Federal-Unitary Distinction
Partisan Harmony, Intergovernmental Coordination, and Market Transitions: The Case of Argentina
Regional Competition, Fiscal Dependence, and Incentives in the Argentine Provinces
The View from Below: The Politics of Public Sector Reform in Three Argentine Provinces
Conclusion: Federalism, Reform, and Enduring Puzzles
References
Index