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Preface to Volume I | |
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Overview | |
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Patterns and Puzzles | |
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Controversy | |
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The Road from Here | |
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Taxing, Spending, and Giving in the Late Eighteenth Century | |
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Poor Relief, Public and Private | |
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The Elderly | |
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Public Education | |
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The Long Rise of Social Spending | |
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The Robin Hood Paradox | |
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Is the Welfare State a Free Lunch? | |
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An Educational Puzzle | |
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Findings | |
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Nine Conclusions | |
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How Social Spending Emerged before World War II | |
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Lessons from the Postwar Boom | |
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Since 1980, Aging Has Brought New Budget Pressures | |
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Unlocking the Free-Lunch Puzzle | |
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How Welfare States Control the Disincentives | |
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Early Retirement: A True, but Limited, Cost | |
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The Pro-Growth Side of High Social Spending | |
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Reconciling Europe's Unemployment with Its Satisfactory Growth | |
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Two Cost-Cutting Principles in Democratic Welfare States | |
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The Rise of Social Spending | |
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Poor Relief before 1880 | |
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How Much Did Europe Give the Poor before 1880? | |
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Private Charity in Early Modern Europe: A Miscellany of Pittances | |
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The Amounts of Public Poor Relief to 1880 | |
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How Europe Gave Relief and for What | |
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The Eternal Search for the Worthy and Unworthy Poor | |
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The Battle over Putting the Poor to Work | |
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Indoor versus Outdoor Relief | |
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Administrative Costs | |
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What They Gave: Cash versus Aid in Kind | |
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Who Received It | |
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Town versus Country | |
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American Private and Public Relief before the New Deal | |
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How Much Public Relief Was Given | |
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Private Charity in the United States and the Crowding Out Issue | |
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Two Attacks on Outdoor Relief in New York | |
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Summary | |
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Interpreting the Puzzles of Early Poor Relief | |
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The Rise and Fall of England's Old Poor Law, 1780-1834 | |
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Who Supported England's Old Poor Law? | |
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The Reform Acts, Voice, and the Poor | |
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The Rural-Urban Puzzle | |
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If England Were Invisible: The Urban Bias in Poor Relief | |
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England's Rural Southeastern Bias and the Boyer Model | |
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An Extension to Scandinavia | |
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The International Stagnation of Relief, 1820-1880 | |
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The Predicted Effects of Extending the Franchise | |
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The General Pre-1930 Pattern of Votes and Social Spending | |
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Local versus Central Government: What Happened to the "Race to the Bottom?" | |
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Summary: Political Voice and Poor Relief | |
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The Rise of Mass Public Schooling before 1914 | |
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Overview | |
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To Be Explained: Patterns in the Inputs into Mass Schooling | |
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Competing Theories | |
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Updating the Elite-Pressure Theories | |
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Landlords and Toryism | |
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Capitalist Social Control | |
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Domineering Government | |
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Dominant Religions | |
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Vested Interests within the Educational Sector | |
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The Role of Decentralization | |
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Popular Votes, Public Schools | |
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But What Caused Democracy? | |
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Reverse Causation from Schooling to Democracy? | |
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Religious Diversity and the Rise of Democracy and Schooling | |
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Reinterpreting National Histories of Mass Schooling | |
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France, the Baseline Case | |
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The English Delay | |
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Rethinking German Education | |
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Decentralized North America | |
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Summary: Elites, Votes, and Schools | |
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Public Schooling in the Twentieth Century: What Happened to U.S. Leadership? | |
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Who Are the Leaders? | |
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In Years of Education | |
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In Learning | |
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International Test Scores at the End of the Twentieth Century | |
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When Did This Pattern Emerge? | |
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In Inputs into Education | |
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Taxpayer Effort on Behalf of Education | |
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Expenditures per Student | |
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Teaching Inputs per Student | |
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Teachers' Pay and Quality | |
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Summing Up the United States' Symptoms | |
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The Underlying Incentive Issues | |
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Quantity Incentives versus Quality Incentives | |
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Student Accountability | |
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Competition among Schools | |
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The Long Sweep of U.S. School Choice | |
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Analyses of Local Experience with School Choice | |
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Deviant California | |
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Choice in Higher Education | |
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Subsidized School Choice in Other Countries | |
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Rewarding Individual Teacher Performance | |
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Conclusions: Which Explanations Fit the Symptoms? | |
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Explaining the Rise of Social Transfers Since 1880 | |
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Who Were the Pioneers before 1930? | |
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Shared Fears from World Wars and the Great Depression | |
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The Role of Political Voice | |
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Democracies, Elite Democracies, and Full Democracies | |
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Votes for Women | |
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The Rate of Turnover of the Chief Executive | |
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The Role of Aging: Gray Power? | |
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Globalization and Safety Nets | |
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Social Affinity: "That Could Be Me" | |
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Summary | |
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Prospects for Social Transfers | |
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The Public Pension Crisis | |
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In an Older World, Something Has to Give | |
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Pressures in the OECD Countries | |
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Who Is Most Threatened by Population Aging? | |
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Who Is Least Prepared? | |
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How Will Budgets Be Adjusted? | |
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Immigrants and Pensioners | |
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Returning to a Fully-Funded System Is Unlikely | |
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Summary | |
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Social Transfers in the Second and Third Worlds | |
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The Aging Trend Is Nearly Global | |
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Special Pressures in Transition Economies | |
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Third World Social Transfers | |
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Are they on a Different Path? | |
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East Asia Is Not So Different | |
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A Different Kind of Pension Crisis | |
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Global Divergence, Convergence, and the Robin Hood Paradox | |
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What Effects on Economic Growth? | |
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Keys to the Free-Lunch Puzzle | |
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The Familiar Cautionary Tales Miss the Mark | |
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Disincentives on the Blackboard | |
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Harold and Phyllis | |
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Micro-Studies of Labor Supply | |
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Simulations | |
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Global Growth Econometrics | |
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What Better Tests Show | |
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How Can That Be True? | |
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The Welfare-State Style of Taxing: Pro-Growth and Not So Progressive | |
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Recipients' Work Incentives | |
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The Poor May Face Lower Work Disincentives in the Welfare State | |
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Early Retirement: Good Riddance to Old Lemons? | |
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Does the Dole Also Harvest Lemons? | |
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Some Growth Benefits of High Social Transfers | |
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Active Labor Market Policies: Not Much There | |
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Child Care Support and Career Investment in Mothers | |
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Public Health Care | |
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Why These Keys? | |
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On the Well-Known Demise of the Swedish Welfare State | |
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Who Proclaimed It and How | |
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Sweden's Growth and Social Spending Since 1950 | |
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What Went Wrong after the 1970s? | |
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Macroeconomic Policy | |
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The Demise of Swedish Corporatism | |
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What Role for Sweden's High Tax Rates? | |
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What Survived: Pro-Growth Social Spending | |
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Investing in Women's Work and in Child Care | |
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Education and Retraining | |
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Late Retirement | |
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Conclusions: Why No Demise | |
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How the Keys Were Made: Democracy and Cost Control | |
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Democracy, Budget Size, and Budget Blunders | |
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Big Budget, High Stakes | |
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Illustrative Tax-Transfer Blunders | |
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Dutch Disability Policy | |
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Labour's Selective Employment Tax of 1966-1970 | |
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The Thatcher Poll Tax of 1989-1992 | |
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Universalism May Cost Less | |
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On the Tax Side | |
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The Expenditure Side | |
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Hence No Retreat | |
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Notes | |
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Bibliography | |
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Acknowledgments | |
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Index | |