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Antitrust Law Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution

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ISBN-10: 0521793785

ISBN-13: 9780521793780

Edition: 2003

Authors: Keith N. Hylton

List price: $50.99
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Description:

This book is an effort to consolidate several different perspectives on antitrust law. First, Professor Hylton presents a detailed description of the law as it has developed through numerous judicial opinions. Second, the author presents detailed economic critiques of the judicial opinions, drawing heavily on the literature in law and economics journals. Third, Professor Hylton integrates a jurisprudential perspective into the analysis that looks at antitrust as a vibrant field of common law. This last perspective leads the author to address issues of certainty, stability, and predictability in antitrust law, and to examine the pressures shaping its evolution. The combination of these three…    
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Book details

List price: $50.99
Copyright year: 2003
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 3/27/2003
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 432
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.298
Language: English

Keith N. Hylton is the Honorable Paul J. Liacos Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law.

Preface
Economics
Definitions
Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly
Further Topics
Law and Policy
Some Interpretation Issues
Enacting the Antitrust Law
What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do?
Enforcement
Optimal Enforcement Theory
Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws
Appendix
Cartels
Cartels
Conscious Parallelism
Conclusion
Development of Section 1 Doctrine
The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law
Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule
Conclusion
Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule
The Case for Price Fixing
Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments
Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule
Agreement
The Development of Inference Doctrine
Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory
Facilitating Mechanisms
Data Dissemination Cases
Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices
Basing Point Pricing: Economics
Boycotts
Pre-Socony
Post-Socony
Post-BMI/Sylvania
Conclusion
Monopolization
Development of Section 2 Doctrine
Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases
Predatory Pricing
Conclusion
Power
Measuring Market Power
Determinants of Market Power
Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane
Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa
Measuring Power: Guidelines
Attempts
The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine
Dangerous Probability Requirement
Vertical Restraints
Resale Price Maintenance
Vertical Nonprice Restraints
Manufacturer Retains Title
Agreement
Tying and Exclusive Dealing
Introduction
Early Cases
Development of Per-Se Rule
Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule
Technological Tying
Exclusive Dealing
Appendix
Horizontal Mergers
Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law
Horizontal Merger Law
Conclusion
Appendix
Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate
Vertical Mergers
Conglomerate Mergers
Concluding Remarks
Antitrust and the State
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
Parker Doctrine
Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines
Index