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| Preface | |
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| Economics | |
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| Definitions | |
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| Perfect Competition Versus Monopoly | |
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| Further Topics | |
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| Law and Policy | |
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| Some Interpretation Issues | |
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| Enacting the Antitrust Law | |
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| What Should Antitrust Law Aim to Do? | |
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| Enforcement | |
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| Optimal Enforcement Theory | |
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| Enforcement Provision of the Antitrust Laws | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Cartels | |
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| Cartels | |
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| Conscious Parallelism | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Development of Section 1 Doctrine | |
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| The Sherman Act Versus the Common Law | |
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| Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Rule of Reason and Per-Se Rule | |
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| The Case for Price Fixing | |
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| Per-Se and Rule of Reason Analysis: Further Developments | |
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| Per-Se Versus Rule of Reason Tests: Understanding the Supreme Court's Justification for the Per-Se Rule | |
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| Agreement | |
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| The Development of Inference Doctrine | |
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| Rejection of Unilateral Contract Theory | |
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| Facilitating Mechanisms | |
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| Data Dissemination Cases | |
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| Basing Point Pricing and Related Practices | |
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| Basing Point Pricing: Economics | |
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| Boycotts | |
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| Pre-Socony | |
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| Post-Socony | |
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| Post-BMI/Sylvania | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Monopolization | |
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| Development of Section 2 Doctrine | |
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| Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases | |
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| Predatory Pricing | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Power | |
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| Measuring Market Power | |
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| Determinants of Market Power | |
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| Substitutability and the Relevant Market: Cellophane | |
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| Multimarket Monopoly and the Relevant Market: Alcoa | |
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| Measuring Power: Guidelines | |
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| Attempts | |
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| The Swift Formula and Modern Doctrine | |
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| Dangerous Probability Requirement | |
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| Vertical Restraints | |
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| Resale Price Maintenance | |
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| Vertical Nonprice Restraints | |
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| Manufacturer Retains Title | |
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| Agreement | |
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| Tying and Exclusive Dealing | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Early Cases | |
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| Development of Per-Se Rule | |
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| Tension Between Rule of Reason Arguments and Per-Se Rule | |
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| Technological Tying | |
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| Exclusive Dealing | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Horizontal Mergers | |
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| Reasons for Merging and Implications for Law | |
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| Horizontal Merger Law | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Appendix | |
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| Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate | |
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| Vertical Mergers | |
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| Conglomerate Mergers | |
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| Concluding Remarks | |
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| Antitrust and the State | |
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| Noerr-Pennington Doctrine | |
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| Parker Doctrine | |
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| Some Final Comments: Error Costs and Immunity Doctrines | |
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| Index | |