Political Economy of Public Sector Governance

Name: Political Economy of Public Sector Governance
Price: 19.68 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780521736640

ISBN-10: 0521736641

ISBN-13: 9780521736640

Edition: 2012

Authors: Anthony Michael Bertelli

List price: $45.95

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Description:

In The Political Economy of Public Sector Governance, Anthony Michael Bertelli introduces core ideas in positive political theory as they apply to public management and policy. Though recent literature that mathematically models relationships between politicians and public managers provides insight into contemporary public administration, the technical way these works present information limits their appeal. This book helps readers understand public-sector governance arrangements and the implications these arrangements have for public management practice and policy outcomes by presenting information in a non-technical way.

Book details

List price: $45.95
Copyright year: 2012
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 3/26/2012
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 208
Size: 5.98" wide x 8.98" long x 0.47" tall
Weight: 0.968
Language: English

Anthony Michael Bertelli holds the C. C. Crawford Chair in Management and Performance in the USC Price School of Public Policy and the USC Gould School of Law at the University of Southern California. He is the author of Madison's Managers: Public Administration and the Constitution (with Laurence E. Lynn, Jr) as well as more than thirty articles and serves as co-editor of the Journal of Public Policy.



Preface



Introduction



Some Building Blocks



Defining Governance



Political Economy and Reform Movements



Political Economy and Public Management



Plan of the Book



Methodological Foundations



The Principal-Agent Model



Hidden Action



Hidden Information



Conclusion



Theory



The Power of the Purse



The Budget as Political Constraint



The Characteristic Bureaucrat



The Political Economy of Budgeting



Signaling Approaches



Conclusion



Delegation and Discretion



Agency Problems in U.S. Government



The Spatial Model



The Decision to Delegate



Modeling Policy Implementation



Conclusion



Applications



Contracts and Partnerships



Make or Buy?



Contractible Attributes



Enforcement



The Right Contractor



Some Normative Implications



Conclusion



Responsibility and Good Governance



The Good Agent



Monitoring Responsibility



Conclusion


Conclusion



Propositions from Chapters 3 and 4



Recommended Readings


References


Index