Economic Vote How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results

Name: Economic Vote How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results
Price: 8.84 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780521707404

ISBN-10: 0521707404

ISBN-13: 9780521707404

Edition: 2008

Authors: Raymond M. Duch, Randolph T. Stevenson

List price: $36.99

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Description:

This book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation…

Book details

List price: $36.99
Copyright year: 2008
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 3/17/2008
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 418
Size: 5.98" wide x 9.02" long x 0.94" tall
Weight: 1.232
Language: English




Introduction



Describing the Economic Vote in Western Democracies



Defining and measuring the economic vote



Patterns of retrospective economic voting in western democracies



Estimation, measurement, and specification



A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Competency Signals



Competency signals and rational retrospective economic voting



What do voters know about economic variation and its sources?



Political control of the economy



A Contextual Theory of Rational Retrospective Economic Voting: Strategic Voting



Responsibility, contention, and the economic vote



The distribution of responsibility and economic voting



The pattern of contention and the economic vote



Conclusion and Summary



Conclusion