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| List of figures | |
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| List of tables | |
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| List of boxes | |
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| Acknowledgements | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Summary of the argument and the main findings | |
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| Outline of the book | |
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| Lessons for political science and European politics | |
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| Development of the European Parliament | |
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| Powers of the European Parliament | |
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| Power to control the executive: a hybrid model | |
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| Power to make legislation: from a lobbyist to a co-legislator | |
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| Political parties in the European Parliament: a 'two-plus-several' party system | |
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| The electoral disconnection | |
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| The dataset: roll-call votes in the European Parliament | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Democracy, transaction costs and political parties | |
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| Citizen-delegate democracy | |
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| Party-based democracy | |
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| Parties in legislative politics and the making of public policy | |
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| Parties and electoral politics | |
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| Parliaments without strong parties: a history of failure | |
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| Implications for the European Parliament | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Ideological not territorial politics | |
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| Political conflict, indivisibilities, externalities and redistribution | |
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| Solving political conflicts | |
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| The cleavage theory of democratic politics | |
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| Implications for the European Parliament | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Decentralised governance to territorial entities and sectors | |
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| Participation | |
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| Participation in the European Parliament: The costs and benefits of voting | |
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| Variations in participation rates across time, political group and country | |
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| Explaining the patterns | |
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| Conclusion: politics determines participation | |
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| Trends in party cohesion | |
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| Theories of party cohesion | |
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| Measuring cohesion in the European Parliament | |
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| Main trends: growing party voting and declining national voting | |
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| Determinants of party cohesion in the European Parliament | |
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| Variables | |
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| Results | |
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| Conclusion: Growing policy-making power leads to growing party cohesion | |
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| Agenda-setting and cohesion | |
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| Agenda-setting and political parties | |
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| The agenda cartel theory of parties | |
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| Agenda-setting in the European Parliament: external and internal 'cartels' | |
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| Propositions about agenda-setting and party cohesion in the European Parliament | |
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| Descriptive evidence of agenda-setting and policy influence | |
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| Statistical analysis | |
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| Variables | |
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| Results | |
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| Conclusion: agenda control alone cannot explain party discipline | |
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| Who controls the MEPs? | |
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| MEPs: agents with two principals | |
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| Voting with and against the European and national parties | |
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| Analysis of MEP voting defection in the Fifth Parliament | |
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| Variables | |
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| Results | |
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| Relative importance of European and national parties in all five parliaments | |
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| Conclusion: European parties from national party actions | |
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| Competition and coalition formation | |
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| Theories of party competition and coalition formation | |
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| Patterns of coalitions in the European Parliament | |
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| Determinants of coalition formation | |
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| Variables | |
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| Results | |
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| Conclusion: an increasingly competitive party system | |
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| Dimensions of politics | |
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| Dimensions of conflict in EU politics | |
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| Estimating MEPs' ideal points from roll-call votes | |
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| Spatial maps of the five elected European Parliaments | |
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| Interpretation of the meaning of the dimensions | |
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| Variables | |
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| Results | |
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| Conclusion: Normal politics in a territorially divided polity | |
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| Investiture and censure of the Santer Commission | |
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| Formation and termination of governments and the case of the EU | |
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| The Santer Commission: from nomination to resignation | |
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| Analysis: MEP behaviour in the investiture and censure of the Commission | |
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| Variables | |
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| Results | |
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| Conclusion: Government-opposition politics arrives in the European Parliament | |
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| The Takeover Directive | |
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| A short history of the Takeover Directive | |
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| Explaining MEP voting on the Takeover Directive: nationality or party? | |
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| Analysis of MEP behaviour on the Takeover Directive | |
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| Variables | |
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| Results | |
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| Conclusion: parties and ideology matter, even when national interests interfere | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Bibliography | |
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| Index | |