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| List of Figures | |
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| Acknowledgments | |
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| Introduction | |
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| What Does Conquest Mean in Cyberspace? | |
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| Precis | |
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| Hostile Conquest as Information Warfare | |
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| An Ideal-Type Definition of Information Warfare | |
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| Control at One Layer Is Not Control at Another | |
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| Applying the Ideal-Type Definition | |
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| There Is No Forced Entry in Cyberspace | |
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| Information Warfare Only Looks Strategic | |
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| IW Strategy and Terrorism | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Information Warfare as Noise | |
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| Disinformation and Misinformation | |
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| Defenses against Noise | |
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| Redundancy | |
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| Filtration | |
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| What Tolerance for Noise? | |
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| Tolerance in Real Environments | |
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| Castles and Agoras | |
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| Hopping from Agoras to Castles? | |
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| Castling Foes | |
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| Concluding Observations | |
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| Can Information Warfare Be Strategic? | |
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| Getting In | |
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| Mucking Around | |
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| Spying | |
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| Denial of Service | |
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| Corruption | |
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| Distraction | |
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| Countermeasures | |
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| Redundancy | |
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| Learning | |
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| Damage Assessment | |
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| Prediction | |
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| Intelligence Is Necessary | |
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| Intelligence Alone Is Hardly Sufficient | |
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| Is Information Warfare Ready for War? | |
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| The Paradox of Control | |
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| Other Weaponization Criteria | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Information Warfare against Command and Control | |
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| The Sources of Information Overload | |
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| Its Effect on Conventional Information Warfare Techniques | |
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| Coping Strategies | |
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| Who Makes Decisions in a Hierarchy? | |
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| Responses to Information Overload | |
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| Know the Enemy's Information Architecture | |
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| Elements of Information Culture | |
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| Elements of Nodal Architecture | |
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| Injecting Information into Adversary Decision Making | |
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| Ping, Echo, Flood, and Sag | |
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| Ping and Echo | |
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| Flood and Sag | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Friendly Conquest in Cyberspace | |
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| A Redefinition of Conquest | |
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| The Mechanisms of Coalitions | |
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| The Particular Benefits of Coalitions | |
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| Information and Coalitions | |
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| The Cost of Coalitions in Cyberspace | |
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| Enterprise Architectures and Influence | |
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| Alliances with Individuals | |
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| The Special Case of Cell Phones | |
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| Alliances of Organizations | |
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| Ecologies of Technological Development | |
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| DoD's Global Information Grid (GIG) | |
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| Merging the Infrastructures of Allies | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Friendly Conquest Using Global Systems | |
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| Geospatial Data | |
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| Coping with Commercial Satellites | |
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| Manipulation through Cyberspace | |
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| Getting Others to Play the Game | |
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| Some Conclusions about Geospatial Services | |
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| National Identity Systems | |
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| Two Rationales for a National Identity System | |
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| Potential Parameters for a Notional System | |
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| Constraints from and Influences over Foreign Systems | |
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| Compare, Contrast, and Conclude | |
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| Retail Conquest in Cyberspace | |
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| Information Trunks and Leaves | |
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| Where Does Cheap Information Come From? | |
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| Surveillance in Cyberspace | |
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| Making Information Global | |
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| Privacy | |
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| Amalgamating Private Information | |
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| Using the Information | |
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| General Coercion | |
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| Specific Coercion | |
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| Persuasion | |
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| Some Limits of Retail Warfare in Cyberspace | |
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| Using Retail Channels to Measure Wholesale Campaigns | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| From Intimacy, Vulnerability | |
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| Do the Walls Really Come Down? | |
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| Intimacy as a Target | |
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| The Fecklessness of Friends | |
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| Betrayal | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Talking Conquest in Cyberspace | |
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| Four Layers of Communications | |
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| Human Conversation in Layers | |
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| Cyberspace in Layers | |
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| Complexity Facilitates Conquest | |
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| Complexity and Hostile Conquest | |
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| Complexity and Friendly Conquest | |
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| Semantics | |
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| Pragmatics | |
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| Lessons? | |
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| Managing Conquest in Cyberspace | |
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| Conducting Hostile Conquest in Cyberspace | |
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| Warding Off Hostile Conquest in Cyberspace | |
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| Byte Bullies | |
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| Headless Horsemen | |
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| Perfect Prevention | |
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| Total Transparency | |
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| Nasty Neighborhoods | |
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| Exploiting Unwarranted Influence | |
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| Against Unwarranted Influence | |
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| In Microsoft's Shadow | |
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| Microsoft and Computer Security | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Why Cyberspace Is Likely to Gain Consequence | |
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| More Powerful Hardware and Thus More Complex Software | |
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| Cyberspace in More Places | |
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| Fuzzier Borders between Systems | |
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| Accepted Cryptography | |
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| Privatized Trust | |
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| The Possible Substitution of Artificial for Natural Intelligence | |
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| Conclusions | |
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| Index | |