Logic of Violence in Civil War

Name: Logic of Violence in Civil War
Price: 18.79 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780521670043

ISBN-10: 0521670047

ISBN-13: 9780521670043

Edition: 2006

Authors: Stathis N. Kalyvas, Peter Lange, Robert H. Bates, Ellen Comisso, Peter Hall

List price: $34.99

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Description:

By analytically decoupling war and violence, this book explores the causes and dynamics of violence in civil war. Against the prevailing view that such violence is an instance of impenetrable madness, the book demonstrates that there is logic to it and that it has much less to do with collective emotions, ideologies, and cultures than currently believed. Kalyvas specifies a novel theory of selective violence: it is jointly produced by political actors seeking information and individual civilians trying to avoid the worst but also grabbing what opportunities their predicament affords them. Violence, he finds, is never a simple reflection of the optimal strategy of its users; its profoundly…

Book details

List price: $34.99
Copyright year: 2006
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 5/1/2006
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 508
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 1.25" tall
Weight: 1.782
Language: English

Stathis N. Kalyvas is Arnold Wolfers Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he directs the Program on Order, Conflict, and Violence. He is the author of The Logic of Violence in Civil War (2006) and The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (1996).



List of Tables and Figures


Acknowledgments


List of Abbreviations


Introduction



Four Puzzles



Goals



Road Map



A Note on the History of the Project



Concepts



Civil War



Violence



Scope Conditions



Conclusion



Pathologies



Madness and "Bloodless Convention"



Partisan Bias



Political Bias



Urban Bias



Selection Bias



Overaggregation Bias and Data Problems



Conclusion



Barbarism



Barbarism and Civil War



Breakdown



Transgression



Polarization



The Technology of Warfare



Assessment



Conclusion



A Theory of Irregular War I: Collaboration



Sovereignty in Civil War



The Identification Problem



Support



Forms of Collaboration and Defection



The Institutional Setting of Collaboration



Conclusion



A Theory of Irregular War II: Control



The Allocation of Collaboration



Survival



How Control Shapes Collaboration



Causal Paths from Control to Collaboration



The Distribution of Control



Constraints on Military Options



Violence and Discrimination



Conclusion



A Logic of Indiscriminate Violence



The Incidence of Indiscriminate Violence



Information and Indiscriminate Violence



Deterrence and Indiscriminate Violence



Counterproductive Effects of Indiscriminate Violence



Why Does Indiscriminate Violence Occur?



Accounting for the Puzzle



Conclusion



A Theory of Selective Violence



Information



Denunciation



Denunciation in Ethnic Civil Wars



Is Selective Violence Possible?



A Political Economy of Denunciation



A Model of Selective Violence in Civil War



Caveats



Conclusion



Empirics I: Comparative Evidence



Measuring Control



How Control Shifts



Full Control (Zones I and 5)



No Control (Zones I and 5)



Contestation (Zones 2, 3, and 4)



Conclusion



Empirics II: Microcomparative Evidence



Research Design



The Greek Civil War



The Argolid: Political, Social, and Economic Background



The Civil War in the Argolid



After the End of the Occupation



Violence: Descriptive Statistics



Control: Descriptive Statistics



Quantitative Evidence



Qualitative Evidence



Return to Manesi and Gerbesi



Mispredictions



A Replication: Almopia



Out-of-Sample Tests in Greece



Conclusion



Intimacy



Intimate Violence



Why Denounce? A Sociology of Denunciation



The Range of Malicious Denunciation



The Dark Face of Social Capital: The Social Basis of Malicious Denunciation



Varying the Institutional Setting of Denunciation



Conclusion



Cleavage and Agency



Center and Periphery



Kto kovo? The Locus of Agency



Alliance



Conclusion


Conclusion



Data Sources



Coding Protocols



Timeline of Conflicts


References


Index