Grammar of Society The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms

Name: Grammar of Society The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms
Price: 23.58 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780521574907

ISBN-10: 0521574900

ISBN-13: 9780521574907

Edition: 2006

Authors: Cristina Bicchieri

List price: $31.99

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Description:

Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, generated expectations and evolution and change. Drawing on intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge and why and when we follow them. Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend upon the psychological dispositions of the individual and how such dispositions may impair social efficiency.

Book details

List price: $31.99
Copyright year: 2006
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 12/19/2005
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 278
Size: 6.14" wide x 7.99" long x 0.67" tall
Weight: 1.122
Language: English



Preface


Acknowledgments



The Rules We Live By


Introduction


Social Norms


Descriptive Norms


Conventions


Following Social Norms


Awareness and Choice


Appendix to Chapter 1



Habits of the Mind


Introduction


Experiments


Trigger Cues


Spreading Activation


Local Norms


Categories, Schemata, and Role Playing



A Taste for Fairness


Introduction


The Ultimatum Game


Social Preferences


Reciprocity


Norms Matter


Variations on the Ultimatum Game


Evasions and Violations


Appendix to Chapter 3



Covenants Without Swords


Introduction


Experiments


Group Identity


Cheap Talk


Creating Identities


Keeping Promises


Talking to Machines


Cognitive Misers



Informational Cascades and Unpopular Norms


Introduction


A Few Examples and a Fairy Tale


Pluralistic Ignorance


Why Misrepresentation?


Why do People Conform?


The Consequences of Pluralistic Ignorance


Informational Cascades


Lifting the Veil


Appendix to Chapter 5



The Evolution of a Fairness Norm


Introduction


The Ultimatum Game


Emerging Norms


Updating Beliefs and Strategies


References


Index