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| Introduction | |
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| Economic systems | |
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| The control dimension | |
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| Looking for clues | |
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| A projected synthesis | |
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| The plan of the book | |
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| Normative perspectives | |
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| Why care about workers' control? | |
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| Equality | |
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| Democracy | |
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| Property | |
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| Dignity | |
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| Community | |
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| The author shows his cards | |
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| Workers' control in action (I) | |
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| Surveying the terrain | |
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| The Plywood cooperatives | |
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| The Mondragon cooperatives | |
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| Workers' control in action (II) | |
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| The Lega cooperatives | |
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| Employee stock ownership plans | |
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| Codetermination | |
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| Conceptual foundations | |
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| The theory of the firm | |
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| The nature of authority | |
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| The locus of control | |
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| Why firms cannot be owned | |
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| Asset ownership | |
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| Residual claims | |
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| Explanatory strategies | |
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| The symmetry principle | |
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| The replication principle | |
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| Transaction costs | |
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| Optimal contracting | |
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| Adverse selection | |
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| Repeated games | |
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| Path dependence | |
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| Cultural explanations | |
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| The strategy to be pursued | |
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| A question of objectives | |
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| What do labor-managed firms maximize? | |
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| The Illyrian firm | |
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| Membership markets and labor markets | |
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| Membership markets and stock markets | |
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| Imperfect membership markets | |
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| What does the evidence say? | |
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| Some lessons | |
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| Views from economic theory I | |
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| Explaining the rarity of workers' control | |
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| Asset ownership: incentives and information | |
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| Asset ownership: bargaining and information | |
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| Can asset specificity explain the rarity of workers' control? | |
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| Work incentives without risk aversion | |
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| Work incentives with risk aversion | |
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| Can work incentives explain the rarity of workers' control? | |
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| Views from economic theory (II) | |
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| Capital constraints | |
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| Debt financing | |
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| Equity financing | |
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| Can capital constraints explain the rarity of workers' control? | |
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| Portfolio diversification | |
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| Can portfolio diversification explain the rarity of workers' control? | |
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| Collective choice | |
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| Can collective choice explain the rarity of workers' control? | |
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| Transitions and clusters | |
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| Organizational demography | |
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| Formation rates | |
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| Worker takeovers | |
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| Degeneration | |
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| Investor takeovers | |
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| Survival rates | |
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| Business cycles | |
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| Clusters | |
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| Toward a synthesis | |
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| The causal tapestry | |
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| Credible commitment toward labor | |
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| Credible commitment toward capital | |
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| The composition of control groups | |
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| The commodification of control rights | |
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| Intellectual history and current debates | |
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| Is workers' control a unitary phenomenon? | |
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| Getting there from here | |
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| Practical considerations | |
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| A modest proposal | |
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| Reassuring shareholders | |
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| Governing firms | |
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| Trading jobs | |
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| Sample calculations | |
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| The long and winding road | |