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Governing the Firm Workers' Control in Theory and Practice

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ISBN-10: 0521522218

ISBN-13: 9780521522212

Edition: 2002

Authors: Gregory K. Dow

List price: $44.99
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Workers' control is a rare phenomenon. This book provides case studies of worker-controlled firms and surveys available evidence on their behavior in an attempt to explain the apparent lack of success. It develops a policy proposal to encourage employee buyouts.
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Book details

List price: $44.99
Copyright year: 2002
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 2/17/2003
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 342
Size: 6.25" wide x 9.00" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 0.990
Language: English

Gregory K. Dow is a professor in the Department of Economics at Simon Fraser University.

Economic systems
The control dimension
Looking for clues
A projected synthesis
The plan of the book
Normative perspectives
Why care about workers' control?
The author shows his cards
Workers' control in action (I)
Surveying the terrain
The Plywood cooperatives
The Mondragon cooperatives
Workers' control in action (II)
The Lega cooperatives
Employee stock ownership plans
Conceptual foundations
The theory of the firm
The nature of authority
The locus of control
Why firms cannot be owned
Asset ownership
Residual claims
Explanatory strategies
The symmetry principle
The replication principle
Transaction costs
Optimal contracting
Adverse selection
Repeated games
Path dependence
Cultural explanations
The strategy to be pursued
A question of objectives
What do labor-managed firms maximize?
The Illyrian firm
Membership markets and labor markets
Membership markets and stock markets
Imperfect membership markets
What does the evidence say?
Some lessons
Views from economic theory I
Explaining the rarity of workers' control
Asset ownership: incentives and information
Asset ownership: bargaining and information
Can asset specificity explain the rarity of workers' control?
Work incentives without risk aversion
Work incentives with risk aversion
Can work incentives explain the rarity of workers' control?
Views from economic theory (II)
Capital constraints
Debt financing
Equity financing
Can capital constraints explain the rarity of workers' control?
Portfolio diversification
Can portfolio diversification explain the rarity of workers' control?
Collective choice
Can collective choice explain the rarity of workers' control?
Transitions and clusters
Organizational demography
Formation rates
Worker takeovers
Investor takeovers
Survival rates
Business cycles
Toward a synthesis
The causal tapestry
Credible commitment toward labor
Credible commitment toward capital
The composition of control groups
The commodification of control rights
Intellectual history and current debates
Is workers' control a unitary phenomenon?
Getting there from here
Practical considerations
A modest proposal
Reassuring shareholders
Governing firms
Trading jobs
Sample calculations
The long and winding road