Skip to content

Making and Breaking Governments Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies

Best in textbook rentals since 2012!

ISBN-10: 0521438365

ISBN-13: 9780521438360

Edition: 1996

Authors: Kenneth A. Shepsle, Randall L. Calvert, Thrainn Eggertsson, Michael Laver

List price: $39.99
Blue ribbon 30 day, 100% satisfaction guarantee!
what's this?
Rush Rewards U
Members Receive:
Carrot Coin icon
XP icon
You have reached 400 XP and carrot coins. That is the daily max!

Description:

Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn…    
Customers also bought

Book details

List price: $39.99
Copyright year: 1996
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 1/26/1996
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 316
Size: 6.25" wide x 9.00" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 0.946
Language: English

Kenneth A. Shepsle is the George D. Markham Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is the author or co-author of several books, including Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability , The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House , Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition , and Making and Breaking Governments . He has edited The Congressional Budget Process: Some Views from the Inside , Political Equilibrium , Perspectives on Positive Political Economy , and Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government . He has also authored numerous articles on formal political theory, congressional politics, public policy, and political…    

Series editors�
preface
Acknowledgements
The Context
Theory, institutions, and government formation
The social context of government formation
The government formation process
The Model
Government equilibrium
Strong parties
Empirical Investigations
Two cases: Germany, 1987; Ireland, 1992�93
Theoretical implications, data, and operationalization
Exploring the model: a comparative perspective
A multivariate investigation of portfolio allocation
Applications, Extensions, and Conclusions
Party systems and cabinet stability
Making the model more realistic
Party politics and administrative reform
Governments and parliaments
Bibliography