Two-Sided Matching A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
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Description: Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions.
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All the information you need in one place! Each Study Brief is a summary of one specific subject; facts, figures, and explanations to help you learn faster.
List price: $57.00
Copyright year: 1992
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 6/26/1992
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 0.75" tall
|Foreword Robert Auman|
|One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model|
|The structure of the set of stable matchings|
|Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers|
|The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns|
|Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences|
|Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable|
|A simple model of one seller and many buyers|
|The assignment game|
|The generalization of the assignment model|
|Open questions and research directions|