Presidents and Assemblies Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics

Name: Presidents and Assemblies Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics
Price: 5.6 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780521429900

ISBN-10: 0521429900

ISBN-13: 9780521429900

Edition: 1992

Authors: Matthew Soberg Shugart, John M. Carey

List price: $39.99

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Description:

In recent years renewed attention has been directed to the importance of the role of institutional design in democratic politics. Particular interest has concerned constitutional design and the relative merits of parliamentary versus presidential systems. A virtual consensus has formed around the argument that parliamentary systems are preferable overall to presidential systems, due largely to the loss of power to the executive and assembly in presidential systems. In this book, the authors systematically assess the strengths and weaknesses of various forms of presidential systems, drawing on recent developments in the theoretical literature about institutional design and electoral rules.…

Book details

List price: $39.99
Copyright year: 1992
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 8/28/1992
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 332
Size: 6.25" wide x 9.25" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 1.034
Language: English




Presidential and Parliamentary Democracy



Basic choices in democratic regime types



What is presidentialism? Criticisms and responses



The constitutional origin and survival of assembly and executive



Legislative powers of presidents: veto and decree



Electoral Dynamics of Presidential Democracy



Electoral dynamics: efficiency and inefficiency



Electoral rules and the party system



Electoral cycles and the party system



Institutiona: Engineering



Semi-presidentialism: the third alternative



Electoral cycles in semi-presidential regimes



Divided polities and collegial presidencies



Conclusions


Appendices