Legislative Deferrals Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial Power, and American Democracy
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The policy making powers of unelected federal judges in the Unites States are discussed in this volume. Lovell argues that legislators often empower judges in order to escape accountability & thus it is wrong to conceive of the judiciary as a rival to legislative bodies.
Copyright year: 2010
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 9/9/2010
Size: 5.98" wide x 9.02" long x 0.71" tall
George I. Lovell is associate professor of political science at the University of Washington. He is the author of Legislative Deferrals.
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|False victories: labor, congress, and the courts, 1898-1935|
|'As harmless as an infant': the Erdman Act in Congress and the courts|
|Killing with kindness: legislative ambiguity, judicial policy making, and the Clayton Act|
|The Norris-LaGuardia Act, for once: learning what to learn from the past|
|Legislative deferrals and judicial policy making in the administrative state: a brief look at the Wagner Act|