| |
| |
Acknowledgments | |
| |
| |
| |
Military Revolutions and the Iraq Wars | |
| |
| |
1991, A New Kind of War? | |
| |
| |
Revolutions and Military Revolutions | |
| |
| |
The Contemporary Debate | |
| |
| |
RMA Skepticism | |
| |
| |
Thinking about a New RMA | |
| |
| |
The Iraq Wars | |
| |
| |
Conclusion: Theory, Policy, and a Contemporary RMA | |
| |
| |
| |
From Vietnam to Iraq - The Rebirth of American Military Power and the Origins of an RMA | |
| |
| |
The First Iraq War | |
| |
| |
The First Glimmers of Revolution | |
| |
| |
After Vietnam: Constraints and Challenges | |
| |
| |
Countering Soviet Superiority | |
| |
| |
A Revolution in Training | |
| |
| |
A Revolution in Technology | |
| |
| |
A Revolution in Doctrine | |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
| |
The First Iraq War, 1991 - A Revolution Dawns? | |
| |
| |
The Road to War | |
| |
| |
The War Plan | |
| |
| |
The War | |
| |
| |
The Strategic Air Campaign | |
| |
| |
Preparing the Battlefield | |
| |
| |
The Ground Campaign | |
| |
| |
Evaluating the First Iraq War | |
| |
| |
What Kind of Victory? | |
| |
| |
What Kind of Revolution? | |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
| |
The Iraqi Interregnum, 1991-2000 | |
| |
| |
The Calm After the Storm | |
| |
| |
Technology Advances | |
| |
| |
Munitions | |
| |
| |
Sensors | |
| |
| |
Communications | |
| |
| |
Intervention in Somalia, 1992-1993 | |
| |
| |
The Lessons of Somalia | |
| |
| |
Military Operations Other Than War | |
| |
| |
The RMA and Network-Centric Warfare | |
| |
| |
The System of Systems | |
| |
| |
Rapid Dominance: "Shock and Awe" | |
| |
| |
Net-Centric Warfare | |
| |
| |
Kosovo: NATO's "Curious Little War" | |
| |
| |
Operation Allied Force | |
| |
| |
Evaluating OAF | |
| |
| |
Air-Centric versus Network-Centric Warfare | |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
| |
Afghanistan and the Second Iraq War, 2001-2003 - A Revolution Confirmed? | |
| |
| |
Revolution Confirmed? | |
| |
| |
Bush, Rumsfeld, and Military Transformation | |
| |
| |
The Afghan Prelude | |
| |
| |
The "Afghan Model" | |
| |
| |
Evaluating the "Afghan Model" | |
| |
| |
The Second Iraq War, 2003 | |
| |
| |
The Battle Over the War Plan | |
| |
| |
The Opposing Forces | |
| |
| |
The War: Operation Iraqi Freedom | |
| |
| |
Evaluating the Second Iraq War | |
| |
| |
Rumsfeld Vindicated? | |
| |
| |
OIF and the RMA: Precision, Information, Jointness, and Parallel War | |
| |
| |
The "Digital Divide" | |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
| |
The Third Iraq War, 2003-? - A Revolution Denied? | |
| |
| |
Liberation to Occupation | |
| |
| |
Disorder and Insurgency | |
| |
| |
A Budding Insurgency | |
| |
| |
April 2004: A Very Bad Month | |
| |
| |
Summer 2004: Finally, a Strategy | |
| |
| |
2005: Elections, Governance, and Insurgency | |
| |
| |
2006: Insurgency and Civil War? | |
| |
| |
The Rise of Counterinsurgents | |
| |
| |
One Last Try, with a Little Help | |
| |
| |
Evaluating the Third Iraq War | |
| |
| |
The Third Iraq War and Military Transformation | |
| |
| |
The Third Iraq War and the RMA | |
| |
| |
Conclusion | |
| |
| |
Conclusion: The Future of America's Military Revolution | |
| |
| |
The Nature and Limits of the RMA | |
| |
| |
The Iraq Wars and the Future of American Defense Policy | |
| |
| |
Priorities | |
| |
| |
Fungibility | |
| |
| |
Institutions | |
| |
| |
Conclusion: "Re-Balancing" American Defense Policy? | |
| |
| |
Index | |