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| Federations and the theoretical problem | |
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| Why Federalism | |
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| Definitions | |
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| The long search for stability | |
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| Federalism as nuisance | |
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| Federalism as engine of prosperity | |
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| Riker as intermediary | |
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| The fundamental problem of stability | |
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| Basic premises and conclusions | |
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| Federal bargaining | |
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| Alliances versus federations | |
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| The private character of public goods | |
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| Equilibrium selection and redistribution | |
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| The 'federal problem' | |
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| Bargaining for control of the center | |
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| Allocating jurisdictions | |
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| Three levels of institutional design | |
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| Two cases of uninstitutionalized bargaining | |
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| The Czechoslovak dissolution | |
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| The Soviet dissolution | |
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| The feasibility of success in initial bargaining | |
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| Secession: the special road to renegotiation | |
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| Representation | |
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| Two alternative models of Federalism | |
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| A national venue for bargaining | |
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| Within versus without | |
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| Direct versus delegated representation | |
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| Other parameters of design | |
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| Bilateral decision making and the case of Russia | |
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| Incentives | |
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| Institutional enforcement | |
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| The court | |
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| Some simple rules of constitutional design | |
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| Voters versus elites | |
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| Desirable imperfection and a democratic as if principle | |
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| Political parties in a federal state | |
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| An extreme hypothesis | |
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| Parties in a democracy | |
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| The idealized party system | |
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| Integrated parties | |
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| Integration outside the United States | |
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| Australian Federalism and the role of parties | |
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| Canada | |
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| India | |
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| Leadership incentives | |
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| Rank and file incentives | |
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| The party and Federalism | |
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| 1967 and thereafter | |
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| Institutional sources of federal stability I | |
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| Introduction | |
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| Level 2 and the federalist | |
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| Level 3 institutions | |
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| Australia, Canada, Germany, and India revisited | |
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| Germany | |
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| Canada | |
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| Canada vs, Australia and India | |
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| Local and regional design parameters | |
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| Institutional sources of federal stability II | |
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| Electoral mechanisms and societal structures | |
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| Representation | |
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| Ethnicity | |
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| Defining federal subjects | |
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| Number of local jurisdictions | |
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| Authority over local governments | |
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| Bicameralism | |
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| Symmetry | |
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| Presidential authority | |
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| Presidential selection | |
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| Electoral connections | |
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| Level 1 and the scope of the federal mandate | |
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| Level 0 - things beyond design | |
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| Designing Federalism | |
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| Russia | |
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| Electoral arrangements | |
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| Regional autonomy | |
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| Constitutional matters | |
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| Parties and the current status quo | |
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| The European Union | |
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| Background | |
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| The role of parties | |
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| The puzzle of the collusion | |
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| France versus Britain | |
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| EU institutional design | |
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| Conclusion | |