Skip to content

Capitalism, Not Globalism Capital Mobility, Central Bank Independence, and the Political Control of the Economy

Best in textbook rentals since 2012!

ISBN-10: 0472031163

ISBN-13: 9780472031160

Edition: 2003

Authors: William Roberts Clark

List price: $28.95
Blue ribbon 30 day, 100% satisfaction guarantee!
Out of stock
We're sorry. This item is currently unavailable.
what's this?
Rush Rewards U
Members Receive:
Carrot Coin icon
XP icon
You have reached 400 XP and carrot coins. That is the daily max!

Capitalism, Not Globalism shows that, while much has been made of recent changes in the international economy, the mechanisms by which politicians control the economy have not changed throughout the postwar period. Challenging both traditional and revisionist globalization theorists, William Roberts Clark argues that increased financial integration has led to neither a widening nor a narrowing of partisan differences in macroeconomic polices or outcomes. Rather, he shows that the absence of partisan differences in macroeconomic policy is a long-standing feature of democratic capitalist societies that can be traced to politicians' attempts to use the economy to help them survive in office. …    
Customers also bought

Book details

List price: $28.95
Copyright year: 2003
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
Publication date: 9/6/2005
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 224
Size: 6.00" wide x 9.00" long x 0.60" tall
Weight: 0.748
Language: English

William Roberts Clark is associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan. He is the author of Capitalism, Not Globalism, and his articles have appeared in American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, Political Analysis, and European Union Politics, among other journals. He has been teaching at a wide variety of public and private schools (William Paterson College, Rutgers University, Georgia Tech, Princeton, New York University, and the University of Michigan) for over a decade.

Introduction
The structural context of macroeconomic policy choice
Partisanship and fiscal and monetary policy
Elections and fiscal and monetary policy
Partisan differences and macroeconomic outcomes
Elections and macroeconomic outcomes
Conclusion
Derivation of proposition 1