Skip to content

Radical Religious and Violent The New Economics of Terrorism

Best in textbook rentals since 2012!

ISBN-10: 0262516675

ISBN-13: 9780262516679

Edition: 2011

Authors: Eli Berman

List price: $10.95
Blue ribbon 30 day, 100% satisfaction guarantee!
what's this?
Rush Rewards U
Members Receive:
Carrot Coin icon
XP icon
You have reached 400 XP and carrot coins. That is the daily max!

Description:

How do radical religious sects run such deadly terrorist organizations? Hezbollah, Hamas, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Taliban all began as religious groups dedicated to piety and charity. Yet once they turned to violence, they became horribly potent, executing campaigns of terrorism deadlier than those of their secular rivals. In [title], Eli Berman approaches the question using the economics of organizations. He first dispels some myths: radical religious terrorists are not generally motivated by the promise of rewards in the afterlife (including the infamous seventy-two virgins) or even by religious ideas in general. He argues that these terrorists (even suicide terrorists) are best…    
Customers also bought

Book details

List price: $10.95
Copyright year: 2011
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 9/23/2011
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 314
Size: 5.50" wide x 9.00" long x 1.00" tall
Weight: 0.880
Language: English

Acknowledgments
Note to Readers
Why Are Religious Terrorists So Lethal?
Hezbollah
The Taliban
Hamas
The Lethality of Religious Radicals
What Motivates Terrorists? The Afterlife and Other Myths
Terrorist Organizations�Why So Few?
Internal Economies and Organizational Efficiency
What's Coming?
The Defection Constraint
Origins of the Taliban
Trade Routes and Defection
Coordinated Assault
Terrorism and Defection�Hamas
The Jewish Underground�Terrorists Who Overreached
Hezbollah and Suicide Attacks
The Mahdi Army in Iraq
Sects, Prohibitions, and Mutual Aid: The Organizational Secrets of Religious Radicals
Prohibitions and Sacrifices�the Benign Puzzles
Where Are the Dads?
Mutual Aid
Prohibitions and Clubs
Evidence
Fertility
Pronatalist Prohibitions
Radical Islam and Fertility
Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice
Subsidized Sacrifice
Madrassas
Subsidized Prohibitions and Fertility
How Many Radical Islamists?
Recap
The Hamas Model: Why Religious Radicals Are Such Effective Terrorists
The "Hamas Model"
Origins of the Model
Hamas
Social Service Provision by the Taliban, Hezbollah, and al-Sadr
"Why Religious Radicals Are Such Lethal Terrorists
Terrorist Clubs
Evidence
When Terrorists Fail
Clubs and Violence without Religion
Gratuitous Cruelty
Objections
Why Suicide Attacks?
Rebels, Insurgents, and Terrorists
Suicide Attacks
Evidence
Coreligionists Are Soft Targets
Clubs
Alternative Explanations
The Future of Suicide Attacks?
Constructive Counterterrorism
How Terrorist Clubs Succeed
Constructive Counterterrorism
What's Wrong with the Old-Fashioned Methods?
Where to Start?
The Malayan Precedent
Religious Radicals and Violence in the Modern World
Radical Christians, Benign and Violent
The Supernatural and Credibility
Markets and Denominations
Jewish and Muslim Denominations
What's Wrong with Religion in Government? Competition and Pluralism
Not about Us
What's Our Role?
Analytical Appendix
The Defection Constraint
Clubs, Loyalty, and Outside Options
Suicide Attacks vs. Hard Targets
Protecting Hard Targets by Improving Outside Options
Notes
References
Index