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| Foreword to the Second Edition | |
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| Foreword to the First Edition | |
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| Introduction | |
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| The Great Families of Models | |
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| The Principal-Agent Model | |
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| Overview of the Book | |
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| References | |
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| Adverse Selection: General Theory | |
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| Mechanism Design | |
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| General Mechanisms | |
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| Application to Adverse Selection Models | |
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| A Discrete Model of Price Discrimination | |
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| The Consumer | |
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| The Seller | |
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| The First-Best: Perfect Discrimination | |
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| Imperfect Information | |
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| The Standard Model | |
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| Analysis of the Incentive Constraints | |
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| Solving the Model | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Adverse Selection: Examples and Extensions | |
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| Examples of Applications | |
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| Regulating a Firm | |
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| Optimal Taxation | |
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| The Insurer as a Monopolist | |
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| Extensions | |
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| Perfect Competition in Contracts | |
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| Multiple Principals | |
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| The Theory of Auctions | |
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| Collusion | |
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| Risk-Averse Agents | |
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| Multidimensional Characteristics | |
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| Bilateral Private Information | |
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| Type-Dependent Reservation Utilities | |
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| Auditing the Agent | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Signaling Models | |
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| The Market for Secondhand Cars | |
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| Costly Signals | |
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| Separating Equilibria | |
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| Pooling Equilibria | |
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| The Selection of an Equilibrium | |
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| Costless Signals | |
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| A Simple Example | |
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| The General Model | |
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| Other Examples | |
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| The Informed Principal | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| Moral Hazard | |
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| A Simple Example | |
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| The Standard Model | |
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| The Agent's Program | |
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| The Principal's Program | |
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| Properties of the Optimal Contract | |
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| Extensions | |
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| Informativeness and Second-Best Loss | |
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| A Continuum of Actions | |
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| The Limited Liability Model | |
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| An Infinity of Outcomes | |
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| The Multisignal Case | |
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| Imperfect Performance Measurement | |
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| Models with Several Agents | |
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| Models with Several Principals | |
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| The Robustness of Contracts | |
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| The Multitask Model | |
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| Examples of Applications | |
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| Insurance | |
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| Wage Determination | |
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| Exercises | |
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| References | |
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| The Dynamics of Complete Contracts | |
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| Commitment and Renegotiation | |
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| Strategic Commitment | |
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| Adverse Selection | |
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| Full Commitment | |
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| Long-Term Commitment | |
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| No Commitment | |
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| Short-Term Commitment | |
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| Conclusion | |
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| Moral Hazard | |
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| Renegotiation after Effort | |
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| Convergence to the First-Best | |
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| Finitely Repeated Moral Hazard | |
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| References | |
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| Incomplete Contracts | |
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| Property Rights, Holdup, and Underinvestment | |
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| The Buyer-Seller Model | |
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| The Complete Contract | |
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| Incomplete Contracts and Property Rights | |
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| The Irrelevance Theorems | |
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| Restoring Efficient Investment Incentives | |
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| Using Mechanism Design | |
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| Concluding Remarks | |
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| References | |
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| Some Empirical Work | |
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| Dealing with Unobserved Heterogeneity | |
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| Auctions | |
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| Tests of Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets | |
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| References | |
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| Some Noncooperative Game Theory | |
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| Games of Perfect Information | |
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| Nash Equilibrium | |
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| Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium | |
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| Games of Incomplete Information | |
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| Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium | |
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| References | |
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| Name Index | |
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| Subject Index | |