Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation

Name: Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Price: 170.66 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780262121743

ISBN-10: 0262121743

ISBN-13: 9780262121743

Edition: 1993

Authors: Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole

List price: $95.00

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Description:

More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. It makes a difficult and large literature of the new regulatory economics accessible to the average graduate student, while offering insights into the theoretical ideas and stratagems not available elsewhere. Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities. The book's clear and…

Book details

List price: $95.00
Copyright year: 1993
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 3/10/1993
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 732
Size: 7.50" wide x 10.50" long x 1.75" tall
Weight: 3.960
Language: English

Jean Tirole, the 2014 Nobel Laureate in Economics, is Scientific Director of IDEI (Institut d'Economie Industrielle), Chairman of the Board of TSE (Toulouse School of Economics), and Annual Visiting Professor of Economics at MIT.



Foreword


Acknowledgments


Introduction



Price and Rate-Of-Return Regulation



Cost-Reimbursement Rules



Pricing by a Single-Product Firm With and Without Budget Balance



Pricing and Incentives in a Multiproduct Firm



Regulation of Quality



Product Market Competition



Competitive Ramsey Formulas and Access Pricing



Bypass and Cream Skimming



Bidding for Natural Monopoly



Auctioning Incentive Contracts



Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity



The Dynamics of Regulation



Dynamics Without Commitment and the Ratchet Effect



Commitment and Renegotiation



The Politics of Regulation



Regulatory Capture



Cost Padding, Auditing, and Collusion



Cartelization by Regulation



Auction Design and Favoritism



Regulatory Institutions



Regulatory Instruments, Hearings, and Interest Group Monitoring



Commitment and Political Accountability



Privatization and Incentives


Conclusion


Review Exercises


Index