Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge

Name: Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge
Price: 63.36 USD
Availability: InStock
ISBN: 9780262026079

ISBN-10: 0262026074

ISBN-13: 9780262026079

Edition: 2007

Authors: Ken Binmore

List price: $50.00

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Description:

This volume brings together all of Ken Binmore's influential experimental papers on bargaining along with newly written commentary in which Binmore discusses the underlying game theory and addresses the criticism leveled at it by behavioral economists. When Binmore began his experimental work in the 1980s, conventional wisdom held that game theory would not work in the laboratory, but Binmore and other pioneers established that game theory can often predict the behavior of experienced players very well in favorable laboratory settings. The case of human bargaining behavior is particularly challenging for game theory. Everyone agrees that human behavior in real-life bargaining situations is…

Book details

List price: $50.00
Copyright year: 2007
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 3/9/2007
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 400
Size: 6.69" wide x 9.49" long x 0.96" tall
Weight: 1.540



Series Foreword


Introduction



Getting to Equilibrium?


"Does Minimax Work? An Experimental Study"




Which Equilibrium?


"Focal Points and Bargaining"




The Ultimatum Game


"Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study"




Inequity Aversion?


"A Backward Induction Experiment"




Outside Options


"An Outside Option Experiment"




Forced Breakdown


"Do People Exploit Their Bargaining Power? An Experimental Study"




Lost Opportunities


"Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities"




Unequal Bargaining Power


"A Little Behavioralism Can Go a Long Way"




More Ultimata


"Fairness or Gamesmanship in Bargaining: An Experimental Study"




Backward Induction?


"A Note on Backward Induction"


"Rationality and Backward Induction"



Equilibrium Selection in the Ultimatum Game


"Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game"




Generalizing Rubinstein


"Bargaining Theory without Tears"


Notes to Chapter Introductory Remarks and Reprint Acknowledgments


Bibliography for Chapter Introductory Remarks


Index