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Mindreading Animals The Debate over What Animals Know about Other Minds

ISBN-10: 0262016052

ISBN-13: 9780262016056

Edition: 2011

Authors: Robert W. Lurz

List price: $35.00
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Description:

Animals live in a world of other minds, human and nonhuman, and their well-being and survival often depends on what is going on in the minds of these other creatures. But do animals know that other creatures have minds? And how would we know if they do? In Mindreading Animals, Robert Lurz offers a fresh approach to the hotly debated question of mental-state attribution in nonhuman animals. Some empirical researchers and philosophers claim that some animals are capable of anticipating other creatures' behaviors by interpreting observable cues as signs of underlying mental states; others claim that animals are merely clever behavior-readers, capable of using such cues to anticipate others' behaviors without interpreting them as evidence of underlying mental states. Lurz argues that neither position is compelling, and proposes a way to move the debate, and the field, forward. Lurz presents a new approach to understanding what mindreading in animals might be, offering a bottom-up model of mental-state attribution that is built upon cognitive abilities that animals are known to possess rather than on a preconceived view of the mind applicable to mindreading abilities in humans. Lurz goes on to describe an innovative series of new experimental protocols for animal mindreading research that overcome a persistent methodological problem in the field, known as the "logical problem" or "Povinelli's challenge." These protocols show in detail how various types of animals--from apes to monkeys to ravens to dogs--can be tested for perceptual state and belief attribution.
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Book details

List price: $35.00
Copyright year: 2011
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 7/29/2011
Binding: Hardcover
Pages: 264
Size: 6.50" wide x 9.10" long x 0.75" tall
Weight: 1.034
Language: English

Robert W. Lurz is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Brooklyn College, CUNY. He is the author of The Philosophy of Animal Minds.

Preface
Acknowledgments
Mindreading in Animals: It Importance and History
Why the Question of Animal Mindreading Matters
A Brief History of the Animal Mindreading Debate
Conclusion
The Logical Problem in Animal Mindreading Research
Mindreading in Animal Social Cognition Research: The Issues
The Logical Problem
Current Protocols to Test for Cognitive State Attribution in Animals
Hare and Colleagues� Competitive Paradigm Experiment
A Complementary Behavior-Reading Hypothesis: Direct Line of Gaze
Are Complementary Behavior-Reading Hypothesis Necessarily Ad Hoc?
The Issue of Simplicity
Knowledge/Ignorance Attribution in Primates
Those Amazing Scrub Jays
Remarks on Goal-Directed/Intentional-Action Attribution in Animals
Conclusion
Solving the Logical Problem for Perceptual State Attribution
The Case against Animal Mindreading of Any Kind
A General Framework for Solving the Logical Problem
The Appearance-Reality Mindreading (ARM) Theory
How Animals Might Attributes States of Perceptual Appearing
Experimental Protocols That Can Solve the Logical Problem
Visual Perspective Taking with Chimpanzees using Transparent Colored Barriers
Visual Perspective Taking with Chimpanzees using Size-Distorting Barriers
Visual Perspective Taking with Ravens using Deceptive Amodal Completion Stimuli
Visual Perspective Taking with Chimpanzees using Deceptive Amodal Completion Stimuli
Visual Perspective Taking with Dogs using Deceptive Amodal Completion Stimuli
Conclusion
Solving the Logical Problem for Belief Attribution
Davidson�s Argument against Belief Attribution in Animals
Berm�dez�s Argument against Belief Attribution in Animals
The Empirical Studies
From Perceptual Appearing Attribution to Belief Attribution
A Simple Appearance-Reality Screening Test
Revisability Belief-Attribution Protocol No. 1
Revisability Belief-Attribution Protocol No. 2
Representation of Abstract Relations by Primates
Abstract Belief-Attribution Protocol
Conclusion
Epilogue
Notes
References
Index