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| List of Illustrations | |
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| Acknowledgements | |
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| Preface | |
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| Introduction | |
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| How the story evolved | |
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| How did a myth about the CIA role develop and prevail? | |
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| Why did the CIA files remain unclassified? | |
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| The Context | |
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| Foreign influence as a prime mover in Iranian politics | |
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| The Tudeh Party | |
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| The Azerbaijan Crisis, 1945–46 | |
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| Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi | |
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| The Ulama as a socio-political force | |
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| Ayatollah Seyyed Abol'qassem Kashani: the precursor of clerical activisim | |
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| Razmara: prelude to the oil nationalization crisis | |
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| The Advent of Mosaddeq and the Oil Crisis | |
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| The rise of the National Front | |
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| The nomination of Mosaddeq | |
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| Doctor Mohammad Mosaddeq: a sketch | |
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| The initial British reaction to oil nationalization | |
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| The early American attitude to the oil dispute | |
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| Political line-ups in Tehran | |
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| Early conduct of the oil dispute | |
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| The British complaint to the Security Council | |
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| The Washington oil talks | |
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| The World Bank proposal | |
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| Early forebodings | |
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| Mosaddeq's Second Government, July 1952 to August 1953 | |
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| The Qavam hiatus and the Siy'e Tyr popular uprising (21 July 1952) | |
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| Rift among Mosaddeq supporters | |
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| A wedge to break the oil log-jam: the Truman-Churchill joint offer | |
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| Mosaddeq's reforms and the theory of legitimacy | |
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| The British two-pronged strategy: subversion and engagement | |
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| The covert track | |
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| The engagement track | |
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| Diplomatic relations with Britain are broken off | |
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| Final attempts to resolve the oil dispute | |
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| A day forgotten in the Iranian collective memory | |
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| The Downslide | |
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| The clash at the helm; the February 1953 jumble | |
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| The Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi: a retrospective sketch | |
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| General Fazlollah Zahedi | |
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| Internal conspiracies | |
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| The abduction of the police chief | |
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| The link-up: TPAJAX and the internal cabal | |
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| The summer of all dangers | |
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| The taming of the Shah | |
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| The failure of the TPAJAX coup | |
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| The Downfall | |
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| The gathering storm, 16-18 August 1953 | |
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| The backlash: events leading to the fall of Mosaddeq on 19 August | |
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| Monitoring by the US Embassy | |
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| The Final hours | |
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| The military factor in the fall of Mosaddeq | |
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| TPAJAX military planning and the role of Iranian officers | |
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| The Anatomy of 19 August | |
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| CIA station activism in Tehran, 16-19 August | |
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| The role of Iranian agents | |
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| Surprise in Washington | |
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| Ambassador Henderson's last meeting with Mosaddeq | |
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| The CIA money | |
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| An orphan British secret document | |
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| Analysis of the British secret document | |
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| A coup d'�tat, a popular uprising or something else? | |
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| Where Did the Spark Come From? | |
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| The missing link: the Boroujerdi factor | |
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| Summary and Conclusions | |
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| Power structure and internal dynamics in the early 1950s | |
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| Mosaddeq's rule | |
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| The handing of the oil crisis and stalemate | |
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| External and internal conspiracies | |
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| The TPAJAX coup and its aftermath | |
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| The involvement of ulama | |
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| The causes of Mosaddeq's defeat | |
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| Notes | |
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| Direct Sources of the Study | |
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| Index | |