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Concept of Mind

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ISBN-10: 0226732967

ISBN-13: 9780226732961

Edition: 2003

Authors: Gilbert Ryle, Daniel C. Dennett

List price: $27.50
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Book details

List price: $27.50
Copyright year: 2003
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Publication date: 12/15/2000
Binding: Paperback
Pages: 348
Size: 7.56" wide x 7.91" long x 0.91" tall
Weight: 0.792
Language: English

Gilbert Ryle exerted an influence over academic philosophers in the English-speaking world almost without equal at midcentury. As Waynefleet Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University and as G. E. Moore's successor to the editorship of Mind, the most prestigious philosophical journal in Great Britain, Ryle shaped the orientation of philosophical discussion for more than a decade. Independently of Ludwig Wittgenstein, he invented a philosophical method of linguistic analysis, maintaining indeed that systematic confusions in theory stemmed from misleading grammatical expressions. Ryle's most remarkable contribution to philosophy, however, was in the area of philosophy of mind. His crowning…    

Matthew M. Hurley is currently researching teleology and agency at the Center for Research onConcepts and Cognition at Indiana University.Daniel C. Dennett is University Professor and Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy atTufts University. He is the author of Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Scienceof Consciousness (MIT Press) and other books.

Introduction
Descartes' Myth
The Official Doctrine
The Absurdity of the Official Doctrine
The Origin of the Category Mistake
Historical Note
Knowing How and Knowing That
Foreword
Intelligence and Intellect
Knowing How and Knowing That
The Motives of the Intellectualist Legend
'In My Head'
The Positive Account of Knowing How
Intelligent Capacities versus Habits
The Exercise of Intelligence
Understanding and Misunderstanding
Solipsism
The Will
Foreword
The Myth of Volitions
The Distinction Between Voluntary and Involuntary
Freedom of the Will
The Bogy of Mechanism
Emotion
Foreword
Feelings versus Inclinations
Inclinations versus Agitations
Moods
Agitations and Feelings
Enjoying and Wanting
The Criteria of Motives
The Reasons and Causes of Actions
Conclusion
Dispositions and Occurrences
Foreword
The Logic of Dispositional Statements
Mental Capacities and Tendencies
Mental Occurrences
Achievements
Self-Knowledge
Foreword
Consciousness
Introspection
Self-Knowledge Without Privileged Access
Disclosure by Unstudied Talk
The Self
The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'
Sensation and Observation
Foreword
Sensations
The Sense Datum Theory
Sensation and Observation
Phenomenalism
Afterthoughts
Imagination
Foreword
Picturing and Seeing
The Theory of Special Status Pictures
Imagining
Pretending
Pretending, Fancying and Imagining
Memory
The Intellect
Foreword
The Demarcation of the Intellect
The Construction, Possession and Utilisation of Theories
The Application and Misapplication of Epistemological Terms
Saying and Teaching
The Primacy of the Intellect
Epistemology
Psychology
The Programme of Psychology
Behaviourism
Index